

THE PURPOSE OF EDUCATION

An Examination of the Education Problem
in the Light of Recent Psychological Research

by

ST GEORGE LANE FOX PITT

NEW EDITION

with Preface by

PROF. ÉMILE BOUTROUX

de l'Académie française

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
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
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TO THE
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PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION

EXPERIMENTAL psychology has made considerable progress in recent years. Fresh knowledge as to the facts relating to the working of the human mind has been discovered; and a new terminology has been evolved.

It is the object of the present work to apply this knowledge to the elucidation of educational problems, in the hope that some of the confusions and difficulties which prevail, both in the public mind and in that of experts, may, to some extent at any rate, be cleared up. Much of the ground traversed will naturally be familiar to teachers and students of the subject; but the explanation offered of the psychical processes involved in the art of pedagogy may be helpful in the endeavour of reformers to improve and systematise the somewhat chaotic methods at present in vogue.

The chief difficulty encountered in all attempts at the effective presentment of

unfamiliar ideas, consists in the detection and adaptation of a suitable terminology. To some extent, no doubt, this difficulty can be met by the practice of paraphrasing, but the employment of a precise and systematic nomenclature is also important. It is not improbable that many readers may be irritated and even alienated by the frequent use in these pages of the word "complex" for the purpose of indicating those egocentric phases of mind, which are more usually, if more vaguely, denominated by the words memory, mood, or motive. The term "complex" is now, however, current and accepted in all the more important works, recently issued, which bear upon medical, or abnormal psychology and kindred subjects. The study of abnormal psychology has helped to reveal the *rationale* and *modus operandi* of thought and feeling, and the term "complex" has been used to designate an undoubted discovery, arising out of this study, as to the mode in which specific psycho-physical processes occur and function, not only in morbid conditions of mind and body, but also in normal life. The author hopes, therefore, that its use may be admitted here as being neither arbitrary, nor pedantic.

Great stress has been laid on the educational value of high ideals: upon their inculcation and growth. With this end in view an attempt is made to indicate certain important distinctions and discriminations, which are essential preliminaries to that true unification of thought lying at the root of universal beliefs. It is easy enough to profess admiration for the ideal human qualities: charity, tolerance, impartiality, honesty and the like; but it is very difficult to understand why, in practice, these ideals should so often be disregarded, not to say systematically ignored. The use of conventional terms is often supposed to supply an explanation. "Mystery," "sin," "selfishness," "disobedience," "malice," "ignorance" are all made to serve their turn. Words, however, are not explanations. Explanations are the product of experience and meditation through which there is an awakening of the higher faculties of insight and understanding.

It is, of course, generally recognised that certain familiar expressions convey varying implications according to the context in which they occur; and that this represents a common linguistic difficulty. The inconvenience of this

ambiguity, however, becomes a serious trouble when, as sometimes happens, the different meanings attached to the same word are diametrically opposed. Thus "charity" suggests both "self-denial" and "self-gratification" in varying degrees dependent on our preconceptions as to the theory of "self." So it is with "tolerance," "impartiality" and "honesty."

In the contemplation of the huge extent of human suffering some are apt to grow impatient and to demand the discovery of an immediate and final remedy! In this search the trend of thought seems to oscillate between one extreme and another. At one time the prevailing view is directed towards making exaggerated claims for the importance of the inner life, and at other times it is directed towards an exaggeration of the importance of "environment." It is one of the main objects of these pages to indicate the middle path, which avoids these two extremes.

ST G. L. F. P.

TRAVELLERS' CLUB,
PALL MALL,
LONDON.
19 October, 1913

LETTRE-PRÉFACE

CHER MONSIEUR,

Pardonnez-moi si, dans la crise présente, je ne trouve pas la liberté d'esprit et le loisir nécessaires pour réfléchir, comme je le souhaiterais, sur les graves enseignements contenus dans votre livre, auquel on pourrait appliquer le mot d'Aristote : *καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν, δυνάμει καὶ τιμιότητι ὑπερέχει* : "petit quant au volume, grand quant à l'importance et à la valeur."

Voici, entre autres, un point que j'eusse aimé approfondir, en suivant les directions que votre livre nous donne si nettement, et, à mon sens, si judicieusement.

L'homme qui s'interroge sur le sens dans lequel il doit orienter sa vie pour remplir sa destinée d'homme, aperçoit devant lui deux voies opposées, dont chacune se donne pour la voie unique et véritable : l'une va du dedans au dehors, de l'homme aux choses, de l'esprit à la nature ; l'autre va de la nature à l'esprit, du milieu environnant à la conscience, des choses à l'homme. Deux partis, disait Horace,

s'offrent à moi : *mihi res, aut me rebus subjungere.*

Cette éternelle alternative devint, au siècle dernier, le conflit de la religion et de la science, comme directrices de la vie humaine. Selon les avocats de la science, la sagesse consiste dans l'adaptation pure et simple du dedans au dehors, c'est-à-dire de l'homme à son milieu, tel que nous le fait connaître une observation strictement objective. Selon les avocats de la religion, l'esprit échappe aux étreintes de la science, et trouve, dans son attache au créateur, toutes les conditions de sa vie propre.

On ne saurait nier que, dans la seconde moitié du siècle dernier, les allures du scientisme ne fussent devenues de plus en plus triomphantes. La science envahissait, peu à peu, tous les domaines qui avaient paru lui être à jamais interdits : la vie, l'âme, la société, l'art, la morale, la religion même. Or, si, effectivement, tout ce qui est ou peut être, sans aucune exception, ressortissait à la science et, par conséquent, était soumis, littéralement, au déterminisme scientifique, quel autre objet pourrait se proposer la culture humaine, sinon de former l'homme au genre de vie que lui assigne, selon les données de la science, le milieu où la nature l'a placé ?

A beaucoup d'esprits la victoire du scientisme sembla définitive. La religion, la morale,

à leur gré, n'avaient de réalité qu'en tant que branches de l'histoire naturelle.

Mais, depuis un certain temps, cette conception purement objective des choses est fort discutée. On a mis en valeur le rôle de l'instinct, comme irréductible à cette connaissance abstraite et raisonnée, dont la science positive est la forme perfectionnée. On a observé que l'instinct ne guide pas seulement, de la manière la plus utile, notre vie physique, mais qu'il nous fournit les suggestions les plus hautes et les impulsions les plus généreuses, dans le domaine de la vie morale et religieuse elle-même.

L'instinct, dès lors, ne serait-il pas comme la perception directe et vivante de l'être, tandis que la science opérerait, non sur l'être lui-même, mais sur des symboles artificiels, appropriés à notre imagination et à notre entendement ?

C'est, d'une manière générale, le caractère des spéculations de ces derniers temps, d'avoir, en tout domaine, restitué la valeur de l'instinct ou de l'intuition, c'est-à-dire de la communication directe, immédiate, de la conscience avec l'être.

Dans l'ordre spéculatif, on a montré que, ni la logique, ni l'expérience externe, ni l'union de ces deux modes de connaissance ne suffisent à constituer les sciences : il y faut joindre, incessamment, ce contact spontané et intime

avec la réalité, que l'on nomme intuition. Les mathématiques elles-mêmes, pour faire un choix entre tous les possibles que leur présente la pensée abstraite, font appel à un sens caché des harmonies réelles qui président aux lois de notre univers.

Dans l'ordre pratique, on a compris qu'il ne suffit pas à la volonté, pour faire le bien, d'en avoir la notion abstraite, mais qu'un accroissement et un ennoblissement de son énergie est nécessaire, et que cette vertu supérieure ne lui peut venir que d'une communion intime avec d'autres volontés, plus hautes et plus puissantes. "Dieu ne peut être la fin s'il n'est le principe," disait Pascal. Vouloir Dieu sans se donner à lui, afin que lui-même agisse en nous, c'est ne le vouloir que des lèvres.

On ne peut qu'applaudir, semble-t-il, à cette réhabilitation au sein de la vie humaine, du spontané, de l'intuitif, de l'instinct, de l'élan profond et libre de l'âme. Mais il y a lieu de se demander si, dans la direction de notre activité intellectuelle et morale, l'instinct et l'intuition doivent être substitués purement et simplement, à la science et à l'intelligence discursive, ou si la science conserve son originalité et sa valeur propre, en face des formes les plus hautes de l'instinct et de l'inspiration.

Or, s'il est vain de prétendre ramener l'instinct à la connaissance par concepts, et la religion à la science, il n'est pas moins contraire à la réalité de ne voir dans la science qu'une analyse artificielle et infidèle de la vie et de l'action créatrice. La science est l'effort de l'intelligence pour saisir, de la réalité, cet élément qu'on appelle l'ordre, la mesure, la loi, et dont l'existence n'est pas moins certaine et importante que la variété, la souplesse, la mobilité, la continuelle fraîcheur et nouveauté, par où se révèle l'action d'un pouvoir créateur.

La science est irréductible à la religion ; ou plutôt toute religion est incomplète, étroite, artificielle, qui ne sait pas voir, dans le monde, l'œuvre vraiment divine, douée, par la toute-puissance et la toute-bonté, d'une existence propre et d'une ressemblance de la liberté divine. Dieu, disait Pascal, a voulu donner à ses créatures la dignité de la causalité. Et Platon : "Dieu a créé le monde, parce qu'il est exempt d'envie. Il lui a donné la puissance d'imiter son divin modèle, et de se faire dieu lui-même, en quelque manière." Observer et admirer l'œuvre divine, ce n'est pas se détourner de Dieu.

Il serait donc téméraire de prétendre réserver la direction de nos pensées et de nos actes à l'intuition interne et à l'instinct, en prenant simplement le contre-pied de cet intellectualisme

exclusif qui prétendait la réserver à la science positive et conceptuelle. Science et intuition, les choses et l'esprit, le milieu et la vie, la loi et la liberté, sont deux faces de l'être et du connaître, irréductibles l'une à l'autre.

S'ensuit-il que, pour remplir notre destinée, nous devons vivre deux vies totalement distinctes ; que la religion se rapporte uniquement à notre vie intérieure, et que notre vie extérieure doive être abandonnée sans réserve à la science, à la force, à la brutale nécessité?

Le dualisme radical, ou séparation absolue de l'ordre matériel et de l'ordre moral, est, sans doute, une solution claire et commode du problème de la vie. Qu'importe, à l'âme qui s'est installée en Dieu, la conduite que tient, sur la terre, le corps auquel elle est juxtaposée? Mais cette solution sera jugée artificielle par les consciences qui s'interrogeront, sans parti pris théologique ou métaphysique, sur leur devoir et sur leur pouvoir.

L'homme doit réaliser toute la perfection dont il est capable, il doit, autant qu'il est en lui, imiter Dieu. Or il ne convient pas de se demander si Dieu est, exclusivement, parole, ou pensée, ou force, ou action : Dieu est l'harmonie, l'unité vivante de l'essence et de l'existence, c'est-à-dire de l'idéal et de la réalisation, de la vérité et de l'être.

L'homme qui se propose d'imiter Dieu doit

faire un tout harmonieux de son être intérieur et de son existence externe, de son instinct et de son expérience, de ses inspirations et de ses déductions logiques, de son élan spontané et de sa dépendance à l'égard des choses.

Est-ce possible?

L'opinion suivant laquelle il faudrait opter entre l'instinct et la science, entre la spontanéité et l'intelligence, a sa source dans une théorie qui réduit l'intelligence à un mécanisme métaphysique, où des concepts abstraits se combinent entre eux suivant des lois de nécessité, comme se combinent les forces dans le monde physique. L'absolue inertie qui, dans cette théorie, est attribuée à l'intelligence, est évidemment incompatible avec l'absolue spontanéité que, réciproquement, on accorde à l'instinct. Et, dès lors, adopter l'un des deux termes, c'est rejeter l'autre.

Mais l'intelligence, ainsi conçue, est-elle bien toute l'intelligence? Il est remarquable que, si Kant et les métaphysiciens allemands se sont appliqués à dresser la table immuable de ce qu'ils appellent les catégories de l'entendement, les Descartes, les Platon s'abstiennent d'une telle recherche. Même les catégories d'Aristote, déterminées empiriquement, sont tout autre chose que les concepts *a priori* construits, suivant une formule, par les spéculatifs allemands. Au-dessus de l'intelligence

purement logique Platon, Aristote, Descartes admettent, sous le nom de *νοῦς* ou de raison, une puissance de juger qui n'est pas l'application mécanique d'une formule, mais une pensée vivante, parente de l'être et de la vérité : Ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια, ζωή, et, en ce qui concerne le *νοῦς* divin, ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ αὐδιος. Selon Descartes, la raison, ou puissance de discerner, en toute matière, le vrai du faux, n'est pas la faculté d'appliquer une formule, mais le commerce intime et vivant de l'intelligence humaine avec l'être et avec la vérité. Cette raison a d'ailleurs besoin de culture : elle se forme par la réflexion sur les sciences et sur la vie.

Si, dans l'ordre intellectuel, il convient de distinguer entre entendement logique et raison vivante, il y a lieu, pareillement, dans l'ordre pratique, de distinguer entre instinct et liberté. Le terme d'instinct, en lui-même, évoque une idée de spontanéité. Le pur instinct comme premier principe, ce serait la spontanéité absolue, se suffisant, et suffisant à tout expliquer. Mais d'une telle force, qui se confondrait avec le hasard ou le destin, les philosophes classiques ont, de tout temps, distingué la puissance dont les effets se signalent par leur bonté, leur harmonie, leur beauté. La plus haute puissance d'action, selon eux, ce n'est pas la pure spontanéité, c'est la liberté. Or la

liberté est faite, et de spontanéité, et d'intelligence ; non, sans doute, de cette intelligence, encore mécanique, qui, indifférente à la valeur des idées, se borne à les enchaîner logiquement entre elles, mais de cette souple et vivante intelligence, qui a affaire, par-delà les symboles, aux êtres eux-mêmes, et qui veut comprendre et apprécier, en même temps que constater et classer.

Qu'est-ce à dire, sinon qu'une même puissance, celle qu'Aristote appelait la raison, *ô νοῦς*, domine, et l'instinct et l'entendement logique ; et que, dans leur union avec cette puissance, l'instinct comme l'entendement trouvent leur achèvement et leur perfection ?

S'il en est ainsi, les expressions les plus hautes, et de l'instinct et de l'entendement logique, à savoir la religion et la science, ne sont pas deux étrangères et deux ennemies, entre lesquelles il soit impossible d'établir un accord et une pénétration. La raison est chez elle dans le domaine de la religion comme dans celui de la science ; car la religion vraie est raisonnable, non moins que la science des réalités. La religion, comme disait Malebranche, est la raison s'unissant au cœur pour aller vers Dieu, comme la science est la raison guidant les sens et les rendant aptes à connaître les lois véritables de la nature.

Donc, ne craignons pas d'affirmer que

l'objet essentiel de l'éducation, particulièrement à notre époque, est la réconciliation de la science, qui nous fait connaître l'action du milieu ou des choses sur la conscience humaine, et de la religion, qui donne à nos dispositions intérieures leur forme la plus haute et la plus belle. A cette réconciliation l'instinct et la science sont, par eux-mêmes, susceptibles de contribuer grandement. Mais cette œuvre est l'office propre et suprême de la raison, aux yeux de qui tout ce qui est, comme disait Aristote, a son principe dans l'unité intime du souverain intelligible et du souverain désirable.

C'est dans ce sens qu'est conçu le présent livre de M. St. G. L. Fox Pitt. Cette orientation nous paraît la bonne. Dans une telle doctrine se réunissent, d'accord avec les plus solides traditions de l'esprit humain, les deux tendances principales de la pensée contemporaine.

Agréez, je vous prie, cher Monsieur, l'assurance de ma haute considération et de mes sentiments bien cordialement dévoués.

ÉMILE BOUTROUX.

PARIS.

8 janvier 1916

TRANSLATION OF LETTRE-PRÉFACE

DEAR SIR,

Forgive me if, in the present crisis, I find myself without the freedom of mind and the leisure needful for reflecting, as deeply as I could wish, on the important teaching in your book, to which one might apply the saying of Aristotle: καὶ τῷ ὀγκῷ μικρόν, δυνάμει καὶ τιμότητι ὑπερέχει: "Small in volume, great in importance and value."

There is one point in particular that I should have loved to have gone deeply into, following the lead your book gives us so clearly, and, to my thinking, so judiciously.

The man who faces the question how he ought to direct his life in order to fulfil his end as man, sees before him two opposite paths, each of which presents itself as the true and only way: the one is from within outwards, from the man to things, from mind to nature: the other is from nature to mind, from environment to the consciousness, from things to the man. Two alternatives, said Horace, are offered me: *mihi res, aut me rebus subjungere*.

This everlasting alternative became in the last century the conflict of religion and science as guides of human life. According to the advocates of science, wisdom consists in the adaptation pure and simple of inner to outer, that is to say, of man to his environment, such as strictly objective observation makes it known to him. According to the advocates of religion, the mind eludes the clasp of science and finds in its attachment to the Creator, the whole of the conditions of its own life.

It is undeniable that in the latter half of last century the methods and processes of the scientific way had become more and more triumphant. Science invaded one by one every domain from which it had seemed to be for ever excluded: life, the soul, society, art, morals and even religion. Now if all that is or can be, without exception, belong in very fact to science and be consequently literally subject to scientific determinism, what other object can human culture set before itself than that of forming man for the kind of life which, according to the data of science, the environment in which he is placed by nature assigns him?

To many minds the victory of the scientific view seemed absolute. Religion and morals, to their thinking, were reality only in so far as they were branches of natural history.

But, for some time now, this purely objective conception of things has been strongly disputed. We have come to see the importance of the part which instinct plays, and how irreducible it is to that abstract and reasoned knowledge of which positive science is the most complete form. We have come to perceive that instinct not only guides our physical life in the manner most useful to it, but it furnishes the highest suggestions and most generous impulses in the domain of the moral and religious life itself.

Must not instinct, then, be a kind of direct and living perception of being, whilst science operates not on being itself, but on the artificial symbols of it appropriate to our imagination and to our understanding?

It is, speaking generally, a feature of recent speculations that they have, in every domain, restored the value of instinct and intuition, that is to say, of the direct immediate communication of consciousness with being.

In the speculative order it has been shown that neither logic nor external experience, nor the union of these two modes of knowledge, are sufficient of themselves to constitute the sciences: we must join with them unceasingly that spontaneous and intimate contact with reality, which we call intuition. Even mathematics, in order to make its choice among all

the possibles which abstract thought presents to it, makes appeal to a hidden sense of the real harmonies which preside over the laws of our universe.

In the practical order, we have come to understand that for right action it is not enough that the will should have the abstract notion of the good, there must also be a growth and heightening of its energy, and this superior strength can only come from an intimate communion with other wills, higher and stronger than itself. "God can only be the end if He be the original principle," said Pascal. To want God without giving ourself up to Him in order that He Himself act in us, is to want Him with our lips only.

We cannot but be glad, it seems, at this rehabilitation within the bosom of human life, of the spontaneous, of the intuitive, of instinct, of the deep and free impulse of the soul. But we have to ask ourselves whether, in the direction of our intellectual and moral activity, instinct and intuition must be substituted purely and simply for science and discursive thought, or whether science can preserve its own originality and value, confronted with the higher forms of instinct and of inspiration.

Now if it be vain to attempt to bring instinct under knowledge by concepts, and religion under science, it is no less contrary to

reality to see in science only an artificial and unfaithful analysis of life and of creative action. Science is the effort of the intellect to seize in the reality the element we call order, measure, law, the existence of which is no less certain and important than the variety, suppleness, mobility, continual freshness and novelty, by which the action of a creative power is revealed.

Science is incommensurable with religion; or rather, all religion is incomplete, narrow and artificial, which is unable to regard the world as a truly divine work endowed by supreme power and goodness with an existence of its own, and with a resemblance to the divine liberty. "God," said Pascal, "has willed to give to His creatures the dignity of causality." And Plato: "God has created the world because He is free from envy. He has given it the power of imitating its divine model, and, in a manner, of making itself God." To regard the divine work, and wonder at it, is not to turn away from God.

It would be rash therefore to claim for inner intuition and instinct the exclusive direction of our thoughts and of our acts, simply taking intuition as the counterpart of that exclusive intellectualism which claims to reserve to itself positive and conceptual science. Science and intuition, things and

mind, environment and life, law and liberty, are two aspects of being and knowing, irreducible one to the other.

Does it follow that to fulfil our end we must live two totally distinct lives; that religion is only concerned with our inner life while our external life must be unreservedly given over to science, to force, to brute necessity?

Radical dualism, or absolute separation of the material order from the moral order, is, no doubt, a clear and logically convenient solution of the problem of life. What matters to the soul installed in God, the earthly conduct of the body to which it is conjoined? But such a solution will be judged artificial by the consciousness of all who without theological or metaphysical prejudice reflect on their duty and on their power.

Man must realise all the perfection of which he is capable; he must, as far as it is in him, imitate God. There is no need then that he ask himself whether God is, exclusively, word, or thought, or force, or action: God is the harmony, the living unity of essence and existence, that is to say, of the ideal and the real, of truth and being.

Whoever sets before himself the imitation of God must make of his inner being and his outer existence, of his instinct and his experience, of his inspirations and his logical

deductions, of his spontaneous impulse and his dependence on things, one harmonious whole.

Is it possible?

The opinion according to which he must make a choice between instinct and science, between spontaneity and intelligence, has its source in a theory which reduces intelligence to a metaphysical mechanism which combines abstract concepts together according to necessary laws, just as the forces in the physical world are combined. The absolute inertia, which in this theory we attribute to the intellect, is clearly incompatible with the absolute spontaneity, which, reciprocally, we assign to instinct. And, hence to adopt one of the two terms is to reject the other.

But is the intellect, so conceived, in very deed the whole intellect? It is remarkable that while Kant and the German metaphysicians occupied themselves in drawing up the fixed table of what they call the categories of the understanding, such a task is one on which the Descartes and Platos would not have entered. Even the empirically determined categories of Aristotle are of a different order from that of the concepts constructed *a priori*, according to a formula, by the speculative Germans. Above the purely logical intellect, Plato, Aristotle and Descartes admit under the name of *νοῦς* or reason. a power of judging

which is not the mechanical application of a formula, but a living thought, begetter of being and truth: *Ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή;* and, in so far as it concerns the divine *νοῦς, ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ αἰδῖος*. According to Descartes, reason, or the power of discerning in all matter the true from the false, is not the faculty of applying a formula, but the inward and living intercourse of the human intellect with being and with truth. It is a reason moreover in need of cultivation; it is formed by reflection on the sciences and on life.

If, in the intellectual order, it is convenient to distinguish between logical understanding and living reason, so likewise, in the practical order, there is ground for distinguishing between instinct and liberty. The term "instinct" in itself evokes an idea of spontaneity. The pure instinct as a first principle, would be absolute spontaneity, self-sufficing, and sufficing to explain everything. But from such a force, which would be one with chance or fate, the classical philosophers have always distinguished the power whose effects are characterised by goodness, harmony and beauty. The highest power of action, according to them, is not pure spontaneity; it is liberty. Now liberty is made of both spontaneity and intellect; not, doubtless, of that intellect which, still mechanical, is indifferent to the value of ideas, and limited

to linking them logically together, but of that supple and living intellect which deals, by means of symbols, with beings themselves, and which would understand and appreciate whilst it describes and classifies.

Is not this in effect to say that one and the same power, the power which Aristotle called reason, *νοῦς*, over-rules both instinct and logical understanding, and that in the union of these with reason, instinct as well as understanding find their achievement and their perfection?

If it be so, the highest expressions of instinct and of logical understanding, to wit, religion and science, are not strangers and enemies, between whom it is impossible to establish agreement and penetration. Reason is at home in the domain of religion as it is in that of science, because true religion is reasonable no less than the science of realities. Religion, as Malebranche said, is reason uniting itself to the heart that it may go toward God, as science is reason guiding the senses and making them fit to know the true laws of nature.

Let us not fear then to affirm that the essential object of education, particularly at this present time, is the reconciliation of science, which makes us know the action of the environment or of things on the human consciousness, with religion which gives to our inner

dispositions their highest and most beautiful form. Instinct and science are capable of themselves of contributing greatly to this reconciliation. But the work is the supreme and especial function of reason, in whose regard whatever is, has, as Aristotle has said, its principle in the intimate unity of what is supreme both as intelligible and as desirable.

It is with this aim that the present book of Mr St G. Lane Fox Pitt is conceived. The direction in which it points appears to me the right one. In such a doctrine are reunited, in accordance with the soundest traditions of the human mind, the two principal tendencies of contemporary thought.

Accept, dear Sir, I pray, the expression of my great regard and hearty good will.

ÉMILE BOUTROUX.

(Translated by H. Wildon Carr, D.Litt.)

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CHAPTER I

HUMAN PERSONALITY

It is a commonplace saying that ignorance and prejudice die hard. It is not, however, so easily perceived that the death of this ignorance and prejudice almost invariably gives rise to their re-birth in new forms which are but a shade nearer to the expression of the truth than the old forms they have replaced. So also is there re-birth of universal truths, those grand synthetic generalizations, which obtain with more or less persistence among all peoples and in all times. With truth there can be nothing fundamentally new, though its re-expression in terms of current experience may come with all the force and attractiveness of novelty. But the barrier to its reception is just this ignorance and prejudice in the public mind, which it is the function of education to remove. Thus we find many words and phrases in the literature of all nations bearing testimony to the contradictory nature of current beliefs and to the survival of

old ones as to the meaning and import of the human personality. These beliefs fall in two main classes. According to the first and most numerous class, a "person" is the combination of a body, or physical organism, with a permanent, more or less independent, soul-entity which animates it; and for this class the great work of education consists in the harmonising of these two factors. The combination of body and soul, we are told, is something radically "evil." "Man is born in iniquity" and, unless "saved," destined to perdition. With the second class of beliefs, the body is regarded as the real fact; the mind or character being considered as a quality or function of the physical organism, to be developed like a plant by contact with a suitable "environment." The propounders of this school of thought, admitting as a rule that much may be due to "heredity," insist, nevertheless, that the child is born fundamentally "good" and that the whole function of education is the skilful drawing out of its innate excellences.

Now controversialists holding diametrically opposed doctrines, while vainly imagining that they have established the validity of their

own thesis by an elaborate refutation of their opponents' point of view, are apt to exclaim "Both doctrines cannot be true." Well, perhaps not, but they can both be false, as indeed, almost invariably, they are.

Crude generalizations of either kind must as far as possible be discarded and their special nomenclature dispensed with, in order to clear the mind from misconception preparatory to giving serious and unbiased consideration to the results and conclusions of modern psychology on the point at issue.

This done, it may be stated positively, as a fact which has been clearly demonstrated, that the human personality under a thoroughgoing analysis exhibits not a permanent and unalterably separate entity, but a vast combination or aggregation of variegated, fluctuating and loosely organised physical and psychic phases and potentialities, of which no more than a minute fragment makes its presence manifest to our ordinary, or "normal" waking consciousness. An illustration which has been found helpful, though the analogy must not be pressed too far, compares personality to an iceberg, ever changing in structure and substance,

the great bulk of which is always invisible and submerged¹.

As we approach to anything in the nature of fixity and permanence so we approach the impersonal.

We are all familiar with such phrases as being or not being in a "mood" for anything: we speak of an attentive or a careless mood, a pleasant or a nasty mood, etc. We recognise the mental phenomena to which such phrases apply and as a rule we accept them as important factors in our lives, but we often misinterpret their meaning or put them down as inexplicable.

Modern psychology explains the mystery by indicating the nature of the human mind. The researches of modern psychology have shown that the individual mind is composed of a vast number and great variety of psycho-physical "complexes."

A "complex" may be defined as a group² or

¹ This iceberg simile is defective in that it might suggest a certain *rigidity of structure* as a quality of personality, as also a certain *fixity* in the proportion between its visible and invisible factors. The periodic emergence of a whale above the surface of the ocean might, in these respects, offer a more useful figure.

² Neither "group," nor "system," nor "stream" are quite suitable terms to express that arrangement of ideas

system or "stream" of closely associated ideas¹, linked together in some experience, or succession of experiences, with corresponding emotions, perceptions, "memories," interests and range of volitions; linked in such a manner as to be capable of so dominating certain portions of the brain and nervous system as to generate a consciousness², or a feeling in conjunction with those ideas, of egoistic or individualistic selfhood, however transitory and imperfect in its manifestation. The stimulation of one element

associated or combined in a complex. "Vortex" might perhaps serve, though it would suggest analogy with fluid motion, which would have a misleading implication. "Dynamic system" would probably be the least objectionable.

¹ There are philosophical objections to the treatment of ideas as entities or units, just as there are metaphysical objections to the hypothetical atoms and molecules with which science has made us conceptually familiar. In both cases, however, it is mainly a question of practical convenience in nomenclature and symbolism. Further, with ideas it might even seem expedient to use an extended similitude and speak of *associated* ideas as those grouped by a process of *admixture* or *solution*, while *concepts* might be held to represent those *combined* by a process of natural affinity.

² The term "consciousness" implies transitory phases of *mind*, yielding conditions of *awareness* in great variety. These conditions usually involve the focusing of attention upon specific phenomena. The term "subconscious," as applied to mind, indicates such conditions of its

of a complex, generally speaking, excites activity in some or all of the rest. Notwithstanding their apparent independence in functioning, all complexes are really allied to one another, more or less correlated and interdependent, but imperfectly co-ordinated in their manifestation. According to the rise and fall of different complexes in the field of vivid or focused consciousness, so is one's change of mood.

The element of "emotion," sometimes called "feeling," is of great importance in the functioning of a complex, as determining its relative capacity for persistence and isolated activity, and is dealt with more fully in a separate chapter. It will suffice for the moment to say that the term is used here as an expression for the likes and dislikes, the pleasures and development as are differentiated and, while not specifically focused, are yet capable of being focused. "Unconscious mind" is used to denote the potentiality of mind, i.e., mind which is psychically undeveloped, individually undifferentiated and unprepared for focusing, as being *outside* human consciousness, in the sense of not having been assimilated with it. It should be noted in this connection that Dr Sigmund Freud, of Vienna, and his school speak of "*the unconscious*" as covering all those mental phases which, in accordance with the above nomenclature, should be called *dissociated subconscious* activities. (See also Chapter VI.)

pains, as also such comparative notions as "preferences" and "choice of evils," which are characteristic of the bulk of our ordinary thoughts.

The discovery of psycho-physical complexes was foreshadowed, though somewhat vaguely, by Herbart in his enunciation of what he terms "apperception masses."

The types of complexes are very various; they may be classified roughly as belonging to three main orders:—

1. The minor variety, which is by far the most numerous kind and is, generally speaking, the more limited and transitory. These complexes have their genesis in what are ordinarily called "events," or specific experiences; as for example a particular meal, a game, a privation, a lesson, an accident, a dispute, a punishment, an illness, a success or a failure. Even such a conglomerate of events, closely associated in our thoughts as constituting in themselves the peculiar incidents of our lives in the nature of "personal experiences" great or small, forms the basis of a minor complex.

2. The intermediate variety, comprising various intellectual concepts of a co-ordinating

and synthetic nature. These complexes are in touch with certain specific "environments," both material and psychic, or what is often ignorantly styled "the real world." To this order, viewed as transcending mere personal experiences, belong our notions of heat and cold, light, sound, weight, energy, space, number, and the qualities of matter; likewise the ideas of life and death, and of hunger and thirst and food; also the intellectual and moral qualities, such as kindness, cruelty, uprightness, diligence, cleverness and modesty. The element of personal experience, although an undoubted factor in the acquisition of such "concepts," is subordinated to the idea of universality. These complexes are in fact the equivalents of "concepts."

3. The great complex, i.e., the personality or character as a co-ordinated whole. This complex, though rarely awakened as a vivid synthetic consciousness, shows a tendency towards an occasional and imperfect emergence as "conscience." It is in harmony with the Universal Life, when truly awakened; and has infinite potentialities.

The strength and worth of our *personality* is determined by the quality, the mobility, the

elasticity and the co-ordination of the complexes out of which it is composed.

At any moment a specific complex, or several simultaneously (forming a "co-consciousness"), may emerge into the field of normal, waking, focused or vivid consciousness. The rest, the vast majority, remain for the time being submerged; exercising, no doubt, a vague kind of subtle influence in our thoughts and actions, though "automatically," unvolitionally and, so to speak, surreptitiously. There is an abundance of evidence, however, that while submerged in the subconscious strata of our existence, our dormant complexes do not persist in a static condition, but are subject to continual change. Nor do they remain isolated, for it has been demonstrated by means of hypnotic experiments¹ that, after successive emergence, they reappear modified by the assimilation of qualities and tendencies derived from allied complexes; even, be it said (though the fact is sometimes disputed), by psychic communion with the subconscious elements of other personalities.

¹ See *The Dissociation of a Personality* by Morton Prince, M.D. (Longmans & Co.)

The same ideas, or, to speak more correctly, similar concepts, may occur in various complexes, though allied to different feelings. Thus, for example, the idea *food* would present itself as attractive or the reverse according to the condition of the stomach and nervous system, functioning with the dominant mood.

Let us now consider the origin and growth of complexes. They are the outcome of experience, both physical and psychical, though to what degree or in what manner respectively we shall not attempt to consider here. It will be enough at this juncture to point out that, although the distinction made between the physical instrument of thought and the psychical powers is not to be regarded as amounting to independence, or absolute separateness of function, yet for the better understanding of educational processes precise terminological definitions of these concepts are of very great scientific importance. The clearly established scientific data and formulae of the physical world, relating as they do to phenomena so remote from the processes usually called psychical, may of course be treated, for specific practical purposes, as pertaining to forces operating independently of

ordinary thought. There is, however, a danger in doing so arbitrarily or dogmatically. This danger arises out of a forgetfulness of the innumerable changes which such data and formulae have undergone in the past and are continually undergoing: a forgetfulness which is liable to engender a too arrogant belief in their absolutely fixed and universal nature; and in the infallibility, for all purposes, of the "scientific method."

It cannot be too strongly insisted upon that complexes are not static entities, but that they are each one ever changing and developing through their tendency to strengthen and perpetuate themselves by adaptation to or assimilation with their respective environments or that aspect of real life to which they are complementary in the existing world "outside." In this struggle our various complexes compete, conflict and co-operate. In other words, each complex "ego" seeking intermittently to assimilate or to destroy the "non-ego" gives rise to a change in both. It is this process which is most important and obtrusive in the functioning of individualised life.

Now each fresh stimulative contact of the

physical organism with some chosen or "accidental"¹ environment makes an addition to, or some modification in, one or more of our complexes; so also when we "reflect," "reason," or "strive," the mental operation involved implies some interaction between the complexes; while the relatively exclusive absorption, or concentration of consciousness, in one complex, such as is characteristic of intense emotion, great interest, idle brooding, or preoccupation of the mind with a "fixed idea," may tend to the strengthening of that complex and facilitate its repeated emergence in a more or less "dissociated"² form. These relative dissociations

¹ An environment is called "accidental" when its presence is unexpected, or unusual; or where there is an absence of full awareness as to its relativity and proximity to the organism. (See Chapter VI.)

² Objection has been raised to this use of the word *dissociated* on the ground that it may be taken to imply the disruption of what was once united; but the term is often used in psychological writings as meaning merely *unassimilated*, or relatively isolated in functioning. It is generally in this sense that it is employed here, with the exception of any reference to the synthesis of the "great complex." It should be remembered, however, that dissociations are either rudimentary or morbid conditions and that these should not be confused with our powers of coordinate abstraction, which involve voluntary mental detachments and the purposeful concentration of thought.

determine the varying degrees of discontinuity and inconsistency in our modes of thought. They represent also, when strongly developed, those habit-bred and emotionally-barricaded dispositions which result in obstinacy, intolerance and fanaticism. Assuming then that the development, or, as some would say, the awakening, of high character is the supreme aim of education, it must be obvious, from what has been said, that exclusive or too persistent concentration of consciousness in particular complexes is not advantageous, but the reverse. The right process for such an awakening is the harmonious development of various complexes in co-ordination with and in subordination to the intermediate complexes, in the first place, and then finally with the great complex, in so far as its awakening may be rendered possible. This later aspect of the problem is further considered in the chapter dealing with ideals.

The spontaneous tendency of complexes to assimilate with one another may be greatly facilitated by conscious effort, in conjunction with suitable externals in the shape of apparatus for illustration. In all individuals there are certain complexes which are, so to speak, near

the surface, and thus more easily accessible. A skilled teacher will, therefore, by suggestion, endeavour to connect the subject he proposes to introduce to his pupils with some familiar group of ideas and interests. In this way the mind which is brought into action will be an associated system of complexes already manufactured as it were for the purpose of receiving instruction. And indeed it is generally admitted that the best form of "discipline" which can be employed is self-discipline; namely the concentrated attention of the pupil, awakened by a genuine interest in the subject itself, or by devotion to traditional ideals, rather than by a fear of the consequences of inattention and neglect.

One of the most important facts which the investigations of modern psychology have revealed is the extremely limited range of choice, in the determination of his conduct, which falls to the lot of the average child, or indeed, for that matter, of the average human being. Each complex, or group of complexes, has its own sphere of freedom of action and volition. In the actual practical life of an individual he becomes aware, though without full compre-

hension of its meaning, of a continual conflict of his numerous spheres of thought and action. True liberty is, therefore, not a mere condition of life which can be arbitrarily "given" or "taken away" by economic conditions, social conventions, or political institutions. It is a quality which springs from within and has to be gained by effort and perseverance; while that power, above all others, which can stimulate effort and make it effective in the direction of gaining mental freedom is the assimilation of a right idea to the extent of generating a true conviction, or what is termed a correct point of view. Now specific convictions engender, or are allied to, specific feelings; and a conflict of feelings brings about that condition of mind which we speak of as "a lack of liberty." Harmonious feelings, on the contrary, bring a sense of *freedom*; that is to say, the wish or craving to do something we cannot do, or have difficulty in doing, or the desire to avoid having to do distasteful things, is in abeyance. Therefore the test of right ideas and points of view is their power to harmonise and resolve the scattered contents of our manifold minor complexes in relation to one another and to some of those

complexes which belong to a higher order. The awakening of such true convictions is the real meaning of *revelation*. We may pass our lives in the repeated contemplation of various familiar phenomena, the connection between which is not suspected, when suddenly there arises a perception of their true relationship. What is this but a revelation?

Living in a damp cold climate we notice that grass will not grow well under a big tree. We also notice that on the north side of a wall our gardens will not flourish. From these and similar phenomena we infer that sunlight is needed for vegetation. Most of us feel brighter, more cheerful and in better health with much sunlight. The idea grows on us that sunlight is not only a good thing, but that the more we can get of it the better. We congratulate one another on the brightness and warmth of "fine" weather and deplore the coming of cold and damp. But let us visit a very dry hot climate, and the condition of things is reversed. We find that vegetation flourishes most luxuriantly under the shade of a cliff, and everything exposed to the open sunlight is dried up. People congratulate themselves on the presence of

clouds and rain! Comparisons suggest themselves to our minds; and, by degrees to some, to others suddenly, there dawns upon our minds the ideas of moderation, proportion, balance. If now our complexes are mobile, that is to say if they are not charged too strongly with the tenacity of emotion, which tends to restrict and obstruct the reception of new ideas, this sense of moderation once gained in certain connections will rapidly spread to others.

The laws which govern the emergence of complexes are roughly speaking fourfold. Each complex has its own dynamic and inherent forces, which will, after a certain lapse of time and change of physical condition, bring it to the surface of its own accord, as for example in dreams. Then there is an emergence due to the exercise of the senses. Next there is an emergence possible in response to verbal suggestion. And finally there is the emergence due to our meditations. One might add, of course, a composite cause of emergence due to an indeterminate combination of any or all of the above.

Given favourable conditions and opportunities for their emergence from subconscious-

ness, complexes, either singly or associated in groups, follow cyclic phases in their development: first there is a struggle for their expression, then comes their temporary fulfilment or gratification, followed by the relative exhaustion of their active energies and finally their relapse again into subconsciousness. The effects of *music* may well be referred to in this connection. By *association* or *affinity* a simple melody, harmonising with the emotional element of some complex, stimulates its emergence into consciousness and tends to give it a generally pleasurable interpretation; while a composition of wider scope will evoke several similar or contrasted complexes, skilfully juxtaposed, in such a manner that they become blended by a sequence or current of feeling into a relevant mood. Thus music of the highest order may be defined as compositions proved by experience to be most efficacious in these unifying qualities. This blending process is similarly the characteristic mark of true wit, genuine humour, the higher drama, poetry, and the fine arts generally.

Space would not allow of a very full discussion of the experimental investigations which

have led up to the generalizations and conclusions arrived at. But it may be stated that the author has himself made innumerable experiments on his own personality extending over some thirty years. With the help of anaesthetics and other expedients, he has done much to verify, correct and explore the work of other investigators. The serious student, however, may be referred to *The Journal of Abnormal Psychology* (Boston) and the *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research*, especially Part XLVI, which contains some very suggestive papers.

By way of illustrating what has been called a "dissociated" complex we may append the following extract from a very interesting paper, appearing in Part XLVI, from the pen of Dr T. W. Mitchell:—

"A complex formed in relation to some event accompanied by great emotion may become dissociated from the personal consciousness, so that all recollection of the event and of the feelings and actions connected with it becomes impossible. A complex so dissociated does not cease to be capable of functioning. For the time being it may become latent, but it may

occasionally exhibit extremely independent activity. A case recorded by Professor Janet¹ well illustrates the results of the functioning of such dissociated complexes.

“A young girl nursed her dying mother. The poor woman, who had reached the last stage of consumption, lived alone with her daughter in a poor garret. Death came slowly with suffocation, blood vomiting, and all its frightful procession of symptoms. The girl struggled hopelessly against the impossible. She watched her mother during sixty nights, working at her sewing-machine to earn a few pennies necessary to sustain their lives. After the mother's death she tried to revive the corpse, to call the breath back again; then, as she put the limbs upright, the body fell to the floor, and it took infinite exertion to lift it up again into the bed. Some time after the funeral the young girl began to fall into somnambulatory attacks in which she acted again all the events that took place at her mother's death, without forgetting the least detail.

“One of the characteristics of these recurrent psychomotor states or somnambulisms, as Janet calls them, is that they repeat them-

¹ *The Major Symptoms of Hysteria*, p. 29.

selves indefinitely. Not only are the attacks always (*almost*) exactly alike, repeating the same movements, expressions and words, but in the course of the same attack the same scene may be repeated many times (*almost*) exactly in the same way. The patient acts out some past experience as if in a dream, and during the attack the senses are shut to all impressions not connected with the dream. He perceives nothing except the idea he is possessed of, and he remembers nothing except that one idea. When the attack is over there is a return of all sensations, the lost memories of waking life are restored, and the events of the dream are forgotten. This loss of memory bears not only on the period of the somnambulism; it bears also on the event that has given birth to the somnambulism, on all the facts that are connected with it, and on the feelings that are related to it. Thus the young girl referred to forgot during her waking state all the events connected with her mother's illness and death. She was callous and insensible, and her filial love, the feeling of affection she had felt for her mother, seemed to have quite vanished."

This example shows how intense emotions

may so develop and dissociate a complex as to throw the whole order and arrangement of our lives out of gear. Inasmuch, however, as the emotional element supplies, or rather concentrates, the driving power of our activities in the early stages of our mental growth, it is of great importance that we should make a special effort to understand its true meaning and function.

What it is exactly that people mean when they insist that a sound educational system should include the cultivation of the feelings as well as of the intellect, it would be difficult to say; for the growth of the feelings in one direction or another is inevitable. But vaguely, no doubt, the suggestion is that the mere acquisition by children of mental and manual skill, added to a familiarity with certain intellectual concepts, without however an awakening of lofty aspirations, sympathy and kindness of heart, is morally speaking unprofitable, and may be indeed a curse rather than a blessing.

Now whatever importance we may attach to the influence of heredity, and this factor should by no means be disregarded, it is quite certain that an ordinary person's tastes, that is to say,

his likes and dislikes, his aims and preferences, are not fixed and unchangeable elements, but that they are qualities which can, in individual cases, be cultivated, repressed and developed within a wide range of limits. It is, moreover, a well-established fact that an ordinary individual's tastes are dependent on his beliefs, perceptions and habitual modes of thought. In other words, he likes what he believes in; and also, in spite of his methods of "reasoning" (one might almost say in consequence of them), he is disposed to believe in the truth of what he likes. What we like and believe in, with some degree of persistence, is commonly called our "ideals."

It may be remarked in passing that this very generally recognised psychological fact, as to the interdependence of beliefs and wishes, is often dismissed with the phrase that "the wish is father to the thought" as a sufficient explanation. But it sometimes happens that the word "necessity" is used to express some attitudes of mind attuned to strong and deeply-rooted wishes or cravings, especially where such feelings synchronise with the mental attitude of those with whom we have to deal. Thus we

often speak of our "economic necessities" when we seek to give euphemistic expression to those settled mental habits, based upon desires and beliefs, to which we have merely grown accustomed. The cravings which have engendered certain habits of thought are in this manner made to appear to be of such compelling force as to suggest the idea of something fixed and irrevocable, springing out of the very essence of our nature, determining our actions "against our will" and contrary to our "interests"! It will soon be made clear, however, that all our cravings are only relative and conditional, and that they should never, except by a misuse of terms, be spoken of as permanent or irresistible.

This brings us to the important and very difficult subject of instincts. The term "instinct" has been variously and inconsistently applied to a vast number of conflicting desires and proclivities, but generally to those more or less spontaneous tendencies, which prompt an organism's activities through the stimulus of environment towards the advancement, or maintenance, of its "well-being." Instinct has been aptly defined as the inborn experience of

the race to which the organism belongs. But what is race-experience? Clearly it must be the outcome of an aggregate individual experience—a synthetic boiling down of innumerable efforts, trials, successes and failures.

However vast and profound this experience may be, it cannot approach infallibility, as the circumstances in which the organism finds itself placed can be varied practically without limit.

In the early part of this chapter we have seen that an essential element in the composition of complexes is experience; and it is obvious that the nucleus of all individual experience must be race-experience. In other words, a complex has its primary basis in instinct. Inasmuch, however, as the individual experience is ever widening and deepening, the instincts themselves must be ever changing. They can consequently be modified and improved by individual effort, notwithstanding Herbert Spencer's sage remark that "there is no political alchemy by which you can get golden conduct out of leaden instincts."

The most fundamental instinct is that which is known as the instinct of self-preservation.

That little word "self" is responsible for much confusion of thought. Its ambiguity causes it to be allied to a number of conflicting ideas, but, in the main, it has opprobrious implications. Thus we speak of selfish, self-seeking, and self-absorbed; while in an opposite sense we applaud self-knowledge, self-control, self-culture, self-respect and self-reverence. Professor Huxley once pointed out that an evil effect of superficial education was due to confusion of thought which arose from the ambiguity of terms in current use, and argued that many imagined that they were well educated when they had merely learnt the art of stringing words together without associating with them any particular ideas!

In this particular case the distinction between egoism and true individuality is of very great importance, and may help us to keep clear from the confusion which arises from the ambiguity of the word "self." The characteristic mark of egoism, then, is the mental seizing upon limitations, a mere complex reaction—a futile endeavour in the direction of fixity and permanence in the phenomenal world; while individuality, in contradistinction, im-

plies, in its best sense, a continuity of higher effort in the direction of inward growth, expansion and unity. Those revelations of the real correlation of the forces underlying all phenomena which we have spoken of are a constant accompaniment of genuine individual growth. Such revelations, or true perceptions, have tremendous executive power as compared with the force of mere egoistic tendencies, with which they are generally in conflict, though their respective energies need not in practice be wholly incompatible with one another. The former agencies, being of a more spiritual nature, act synthetically and sympathetically; while the latter act by a process of exclusion. With an imperfect consciousness of individual spiritual effort, the painful emotions, which accompany nearly all such personal activities, may be said to *precede* joyous realization; with pronounced egoistic activity, on the contrary, painful feelings *follow* upon those transitory pleasures, which result in disillusionments or failures. Those illuminating ideas and perceptions are indeed the fundamental basis of all true modesty; but modesty must not be confused with timidity.

To return now to the instinct of self-preservation. It will at once be seen that its tendencies and activities may vary according to whether it is acting upon the organism from a higher or lower plane of evolution—whether, that is to say, its energies are directed towards preserving the physical organism merely, or promoting the spiritual growth of the individual. This differentiation of instinctive feeling gives rise to a conflict among the complexes ; and all conflict is painful.

The conclusion which we draw from these reflections is that the only real *remedy* for human pain, as distinguished from temporary palliatives, is such systematic education as will effectively subordinate our lower to our higher purpose. This may be called a truism ; but the study of the conclusions of psychology, and their intelligent application to practical life, will help to keep its truth actively in view.

CHAPTER II

EMOTION AND INSTINCT

WE have seen that emotion is an essential element in the formation of complexes. Let us endeavour to elucidate the matter by means of concrete illustrations.

The ordinary human mind is a crowded aggregation of incipient beliefs, mental habits, concepts, longings and aversions, for the most part instinctive—mere potentialities. There is no such thing as an empty mind; nor is there any unchanging mind. These beliefs and tendencies are necessarily correlated, and, as the individual life develops, they fluctuate, mingle and conflict.

A proposition presenting itself for consideration, either at the instance of outward circumstances, or as the result of meditations, is accepted as true, or is rejected as false, with varying degrees of hesitation, according to our moods. If the proposition appeals to us as decidedly advantageous, that is to say, if it

seems to open up the prospect of pleasurable emotion, and if it be not in strong disagreement with some particular habit of thought at the time active, the tendency of the mind is to accept such a proposition as a true pronouncement. Its unpleasantness, on the contrary, at once prompts its rejection. There are exceptions to the latter course in the case of so-called timid natures, whose egoism takes the form of credulity or over-suggestability, coupled with a morbid apprehension of any invasion of the sanctity of their personality: but this exception does not affect the general rule.

Let the proposition, for example, be related to Art, some question of architectural style, a scheme of decoration, the quality or disposition of furniture: we call it a matter of good or of bad taste, according to our predilections. Let us suppose that it is a political question, or one of literature, science, or religion, and that it forms the topic of discussion with acquaintances. If now it should happen that the question is one which excites in us strong feelings, then agreement stimulates mutual interest and sympathy between individuals, apparently irrespective of the real character

and essential merits of the subject discussed. The tendency also is towards hasty and unwarranted generalization. We are apt to call the people who are in accord with us, nice people, interesting and well-informed: those who differ from us are ignorant and evilly-disposed! Furthermore, when a proposition is supposed to correspond with what we imagine to be the universal experience of our fellows, tested by observation and accepted on authority, we call it "objective truth." Thus in former days the revolution of the sun and stars round the earth, as centre of the universe, was an obvious "fact," an "objective truth": and Galileo for holding contrary views was considered an enemy of the human race!

The contention here is not that there are no reliable criteria for distinguishing right from wrong, what is true from what is false, but that they do not exist wholly apart from the processes of mind, of which the emotional quality is an important factor in their growth and determination. In other words, human judgment is necessarily related to temporal conditions and at its best it is neither absolute nor final. However much we may insist, as we often do, that

we are quite impartial in our judgments, and however near some may approach to that ideal, yet it can hardly be gainsaid that, in practical life, impartiality is never to be counted on.

Many years ago John Stuart Mill argued with great force that all our accepted rules dealing with the idea of justice and fair play were mere human conventions based upon established beliefs of very slight permanent validity. Such conventions have their value, no doubt, in giving expression to prevalent beliefs; they help men to co-operate, by reminding them of their mutual obligations. But no sensible person to-day would insist that any convention, although it may be embodied in the law of the land, must be regarded as absolutely fixed and irrevocable. Trouble inevitably arises when sections of the community, having lost faith in the authority of certain conventions, find themselves in conflict with the law, while at the same time other sections insist upon the sacredness of the law, as an embodiment of eternal truth. More especially is this the case when, as often happens, the same individuals or groups accept conflicting conventions with almost equal fervour!

The organised life of civilised states has developed rapidly, and it has certainly become very complicated, but all the elaborate machinery set up by democracies for the readjustment of laws by means of legislation, and for the alteration of the *personnel* of administration, appears to be still quite inadequate to cope with the very numerous manifestations of discontent. The demands made in diverse quarters for the greater satisfaction of "natural rights" is becoming daily more insistent. On all sides the cry is the same: "All we ask for is justice"; and few there are who suspect that the only real satisfaction comes from within.

Shakespeare's play *The Merchant of Venice* was evidently written with the object of bringing home to the average intelligence the great truth that "laws" must be harmonised to conform with mercy; and it is rather curious to note, that notwithstanding our professedly great admiration for Shakespeare, what a confused kind of controversy is invariably provoked by the occasional revival of public presentations of this play.

The spirit of unrest, which at present prevails in all departments of our communal life,

both in thought and practice, seems to call loudly for the awakening of some higher faith in the purpose and destiny of individual existence ; and how is this possible without a serious effort being made to introduce a really moral and religious atmosphere into popular education ? For it is difficult to see how all this confusion in our intellectual standards of value can by any possibility be resolved, so long as the egoistic and emotional character of the human mind remains undisciplined and rampant. When, however, the energies of our emotions are subdued or sublimated by alliance with higher ideals, then there is more elasticity and free play between the minor complexes, less danger of their dissociative emergence into consciousness, and as a consequence a clearance of the field for the exercise of our higher powers of perception and understanding.

We have seen that it is instinct which is the foundation and origin of the complexes ; and that instinct has a twofold function : first the development, preservation and reproduction of the physical organism, as an individual organism : secondly the evolution of this organism as an instrument or vehicle of the

higher purpose of the race to which it belongs. These two functions may operate harmoniously together; or they may act, if undue stress is laid on one or the other function, in apparent conflict.

Activity due to instinct is generally speaking either pleasurable or painful, according to its direction—whether that direction be positive or negative. It is directed positively in the exercise of the nutritive and reproductive functions of our bodies, in the development of the various senses and organs of the body, and in the development of the intellectual faculties. It is directed negatively when it manifests itself as warnings and pains, which arise from the apprehension of dangers, either physical, intellectual, or moral, such as occur in the form of disease, or in the form of violent shocks to the system. The correct interpretation of instinctive feelings is, therefore, of the highest importance to our welfare; and it follows that we should endeavour as early as possible to supplement the instinctive tendencies of our nature by the cultivation of intelligent volitions, and by the stimulation of the habit of rapidly forming sound judgments in difficult situations. If we

allow mere pleasurable sensations to prompt our thoughts and actions, thus using what intellectual powers we may first acquire towards the gratification of instinctive desires, our instincts themselves become perverted. Such perversion is unfortunately only too common. We see the wholesome appetite for food rapidly degenerate into gluttony. We see the instincts of self-preservation, of sense development, of reproduction and of intellectual growth perverted into luxurious living, æsthetic sensuality, lust and vanity.

A great danger lurks in the oft-repeated saying: "Let us enjoy ourselves while we are young and when we can." There is fortunately a happy mean which lies between the extreme of asceticism, of puritanical notions which regard all enjoyment as sinful, on the one hand; and of the opposite extreme, the short-sighted hedonism of mere pleasure seeking, on the other.

The reaction against repression, as an educational ideal, seems to have gone quite far enough, so that we are now confronted with some very extravagant claims as to the "rights of children." Many are apt now-a-days to lose sight of the important fact that habits, growing out

of the unrestrained vent given to instinctive feelings in youth, are likely to become very stubborn barriers to the individual's higher intellectual and moral development. These habits tend towards the production of a multitude of irrational and superstitious beliefs, fancies, false and exaggerated expectations. Vague notions of "luck" and "chance" fill the thoughts with an inevitable train of disappointments, resentments and bitterness.

If all instincts were directed simply towards the preservation, development and reproduction of the physical organism, without regard to any higher human purpose, then indeed the continuity of mankind as a manifestation of spiritual life would be impossible. As a fact, however, there are instinctive energies continually exerting themselves throughout the various phases of our intellectual and moral growth; and inasmuch as the healthy development of this growth involves the harmonious interaction, mutually conscious and volitional, between different individual lives, too great importance cannot be attached to the intelligent co-ordination, sublimation and systematic training of instinctive feelings.

One of the most noticeable consequences of the neglect of such systematic training is to be seen in the mental habit of impatience with outward conditions; that exaggerated longing for the immediate emergence of tangible results from all efforts and actions; a longing which often finds expression in a futile and vulgar utilitarianism. Then again that narrow outlook upon life engendered by strong feelings associated with an inadequate intellectual and moral equipment, leads to what is known as "cock-sureness"—a distressing form of conceit impenetrable to pure reason. The immensity of the phenomenal world, with its balancing tendencies of innumerable conflicting influences, is disputed or ignored; and the pain, which follows disillusionment, finds its vent in pessimism, or in the preposterous doctrine called the "philosophy of discontent."

But patience is not apathy. Energies well directed, first within and then without, lead to lasting results; and unsought for though they be in their outward aspect, their fruit is the growth of a noble character.

CHAPTER III

CHARACTER VERSUS REPUTATION

ARE character and reputation necessarily in opposition to one another? The answer to this question must depend, as in all verbal propositions, on the implication of the words used.

Shakespeare makes Iago say to Othello:—

Good name, in man or woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something,
nothing;
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he who filches from me my good name,
Robs me of that, which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed.

This is a striking passage and is often quoted, but, if carefully analysed, it soon becomes apparent that neither from a legal, economic, nor from an ethical point of view is it at all sound. Moreover on another occasion the same worthy says to Cassio:—"Reputation is an idle and most false imposition; oft got without merit, and lost without deserving." Now Iago was a

clever rascal of good repute, who did not, as a rule, say things with a view to helping his fellow-creatures to arrive at a better understanding of what was true; and in both the above citations he was endeavouring to mislead by specious and fallacious utterances. Good name and good reputation are synonymous; but they do not invariably tally with good character. The character of an individual is his actual nature, his true qualities, capacities and disposition; his reputation is the recorded or otherwise expressed opinions, or beliefs, which are generally held in regard to him and his works. There may be much coincidence between reputation and character, but it need not necessarily be so. Both have their proper uses in their respective spheres. It will, however, be very generally conceded as being quite obvious that character, as an aim and as a determining factor in mankind's well-being, is of immeasurably greater importance than mere reputation. Very generally conceded, that is to say, by those who will pause to reflect; for it must be admitted that the opposite view prevails largely in our practical work-a-day life.

How does the confusion arise? In the first place it is held, and quite properly, that we can only judge of results, unless indeed we are endowed with super-normal faculties, which, as a rule, we do not possess. Thus the habit grows of looking for *results* and endeavouring to obtain them, not as a means of forming sound judgments as to the meaning and purpose of life, but as constituting in themselves the true use and goal of our existence. It is, then, just this inversion of the proper relations of the inward and outward, of means and end, that is responsible for the pernicious custom, widely prevalent, of neglecting, not to say ignoring, the importance of character-training.

One of the worst consequences of this exaggerated regard for reputation is the constant struggle to *appear consistent* and to gain, by one trick or another, some of the *outward marks* of virtue, ability, distinction and credibility, rather than to make the effort to develop the higher qualities in themselves. Thus as civilization advances and the complications of life grow greater, we are confronted with the most deplorable waste of human energy in the vain attempt of individuals, groups, classes and

nations to maintain their position in the eyes of the world; a struggle which manifests itself in that great mass of affectation and vulgar display; and in those varieties of fraud, folly and make-believe, which we all see and deplore, but fail adequately to cope with. It is important to note, however, that this exaggerated and topsy-turvy attitude towards the relative positions of character and reputation does not necessitate either the repudiation, nor even the disregard, of one or the other. It is a question solely of the view we take of their relative positions. The point is: which shall be predominant; which is to be subordinated and which is to be considered supreme? For undoubtedly a due regard to reputation has its value in the regulation of our lives. It is a form of discipline which under present conditions cannot well be dispensed with. It is a useful corrective, a test, or measure of practical efficiency, and a strong, though an inferior, incentive to honest effort. It is not uncommon, for example, to hear people protest that they do not care in the least for what others say or think of them; without, in fact, having any genuine, or enduring, belief in the truth of their protestation. This reckless

pretence that one is always following the dictates of "conscience" when, in truth, the actual prompter is some egoistic delusion, whether it be mere vanity or ill-temper, tends by constant repetition to destroy the sense of shame which is a very powerful moral force.

The difficulty of the educational problem, which presents itself when we endeavour to inculcate the superiority of character to reputation, lies in the fact that the early stages of child-development depend so largely upon the feeding and cultivation of the minor complexes, in which narrow egocentric thoughts and feelings must necessarily predominate. The problem then assumes this form : how are we to counteract these budding and multifarious egoisms in the minor complexes without destroying all incentives to effort? This problem is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

INCENTIVES TO EFFORT. ECONOMICS

WE exert ourselves to obtain pleasure and to avoid pain; to reach out towards what attracts, and to escape from what repels. Experience teaches us what is good for us. Thus stated the question of our incentives appears simple enough. But in reality it is not so.

A child sees something that looks good, or smells good, and so thrusts it into his mouth. He may find it bitter, or too hot—not at all what he expected. Grown-up people likewise are deceived by their senses, by their opinions, by their false inferences and expectations. What is learnt by experience one day may have to be unlearnt the next. Further, similar objects may appear attractive at one time and repellent at another. Even at the same moment we may be both attracted and repelled by the same, or what appears to be the same, course of action by different sides of our nature, by different complexes in short.

It is true, of course, that certain customs

and beliefs have gained general acceptance as a result partly of experience and partly of tradition.

Let us examine some of these accepted beliefs. Physical and mental enjoyment, resulting from the exercise of the senses, bodily exercise, rational intellectual pursuits and diversions, which meet with approbation, applause, or "legitimate success," and which result in personal advancement in the eyes of the world; a life, in short, of distinction, pleasure or ease; any, or all these aims, are, by tacit consent, recognised as worthy objects of existence; and advantageous, not to say necessary, incentives to effort. The making of adequate provisions for securing and perpetuating such obviously good things is called foresight, prudence, common sense. Yet, strange to say, we can, in certain moods, admire far more the motives of those who systematically discard all such aims as these. In our higher moods the ordinary outlook upon life appears to us, not as common sense, but as commonplace, selfish and vulgar!

That beautiful word love is much used and abused in describing human motives. It is, in

fact, associated with two distinct ideas having opposed tendencies. Correctly it is used to denote that expansive force in our nature which arises out of a surrender of egoistic thoughts and feelings; but it is also used as applying to the extension of our egoism as allied to the sense of property and possession. In this sense it would more properly be termed affection. In its best meaning, love is indicative of the highest religious emotion, not the mere profession of a creed, nor mere devotion to ceremonial observances, but as indicating reverence for the eternally true and the divinely beautiful in both man and nature. In the other sense, love implies a mere attachment to our belongings, or would-be possessions, such as our homes, families, friends. Thus an individual says he loves, when he speaks of the things that are particularly *his*, or the things he would like to *have*. He says:—I love *my* home (or *our* home), *my* family, *my* friends, *my* art, *my* country, *my* religion. These objects may certainly be shared with others, but mixed with the idea of exclusion and proprietorship. This is not true love, but affection. It is only when the egoistic feeling is in abeyance that we can

truly be said to love. Then indeed we see life in its proper perspective. We are then able to perceive that the basis upon which the great bulk of human motives rests is a sense of the absolute separateness of one individual from another and of one complex from another; that sense which arises from our deeply rooted belief in our physical and psychic isolation. In that belief we develop most of our ideals, we seek our security, and we formulate our plans.

However much we may protest that this belief is delusive and misleading, its almost universal existence is a hard fact, a fact which has to be reckoned with and provided for, if we would deal with our fellow-men. What is more, an adequate understanding of its true meaning and implication, its force, scope and limitations, must be acquired before we can make any serious progress in any attempt to remove its baneful influence by means of education.

It is to the sense of separateness that the economic fabric of our lives owes its rise. Economic systems at once emphasize the fact of its existence, and supply, though only partially and imperfectly, a means of escape. This sense of separateness, as it obtains in the ordinary

human mind, is somewhat distorted, perverted, and, so to speak, uneducated. It tends to promote error of judgment in so far as it makes the temporary and conditional limits of perception appear absolute and final. It makes the mere spatial and transitory relationship of things appear absolutely fixed and complete. It obscures one of the most fundamental facts of life, for, whether we know it or not, we are necessarily interdependent, we must perforce co-operate with one another, however much we may hug the belief in our independence. Herein arises, by a process of inversion, a strange anomaly. We have come to regard *money*, the very instrument forged by long ages of civilization to unite our energies in productive activity, as the real basis of true independence; as indeed the only effective and honourable means of securing freedom in our lives!

It is often assumed, as a self-evident proposition, that finance is an absolutely essential factor in the production of life's necessities. A moment's reflection would convince us how absurd the proposition is, for it does not require any great stretch of imagination to conceive the existence of a state of things

in which human beings had learnt to co-operate spontaneously for their mutual aid, without requiring any cumbersome machinery for measuring, checking and regulating their individual and collective activities. History has, in fact, furnished us with examples of such true community of interest and endeavour. One might instance the building of some of our finest cathedrals. Even to-day the best part of our social life has a non-economic basis. The suggestion is not that we could forthwith dispense with our economic system, or even that at this stage it would be advantageous. The point is, that finance absorbs too much of our thoughts, and wrongly. The economic sphere has become too dominant, too insistent; it no longer occupies its proper place in our lives. The instrument, or servant, has become master!

Why is this? It is the outcome of that process of perversion, or rather inversion, already referred to in the last chapter. Civilization has developed very rapidly. The application of our minds to material considerations has, in proportion to our moral growth, been somewhat overdone, and a readjustment, a systematic co-ordination has become necessary.

Money is supposed to be a standard of "value" and a measure of "value." Much has been written as to the meaning of value. It is not, however, necessary to enter here into the technical minutiae of economic science. From a psychological point of view, value is the mental estimation of what appears to us good, or desirable; but seeing that such estimation varies from time to time, both with the same individual according to his conditions and circumstances, and with the different individuals into whose lives we enter, it is evidently a bootless task to attempt to fix, or define, some measure of value so as to give it anything approaching to universal application. Money, no doubt, has its own function in its proper sphere, but the mistake we are constantly making is to try to measure by its means that with which it is altogether incommensurate.

The delusion that money is an universal power, meeting all human needs, is a superstition amounting almost to idolatry.

Those moments in which we feel and perceive the underlying *oneness* of our lives are, it must be admitted, very rare. We do not at all times and in all circumstances realise our

essential interdependence. Our whole natures have not yet acquired the capacity of giving and receiving freely. There is that in us, more especially as regards what we call our material interests, which *exacts a quid pro quo* for services rendered and "benefits" exchanged. It is our "dignity," we say, which demands it. Our "self-respect" requires it. Why, without such demand "we should be the prey to the idle, the greedy, the vicious"! But that which really makes the demand is the innate egoism of our rudimentary natures, however much we may dress it up in high-sounding phrases. It is egoism which creates economic values just as certainly as it creates vice and greed and indolence.

Let us be clear about this before we endeavour to determine the remedy for our present ills.

Viewing the various social and political institutions of our times with honest and impartial judgment we cannot help seeing that they are all, more or less, built up on what is termed an economic basis. Whatever may be the superstructure, the foundation, or legal status, is one of "property," "endowment," and "contract." Religious, charitable, philanthropic, educational, industrial institutions, the institutions

of marriage, of birth, of rank, of social procedure are all incorporated under the laws of contract relating to property, for privileged or exclusive use. Their dignity, prestige, honour, the measure of their freedom, power and stability are generally estimated in terms of money. Persons and institutions without property have "no stake in the country." Indeed with many people money has come to be regarded as a substitute for exertion, as the only true refuge and safeguard; even as a means of masking or concealing vice! Money is the power most admired, most respected, most coveted by the mass of mankind to-day, rich and poor alike, who are rapidly coming to consider that the "struggle for life" is a financial struggle, pure and simple!

That this should be the state of civilization in which we find ourselves placed is evidence of the way in which we have been brought up, and of the ideals under whose influence we have grown to be what we are. The facts need not be insisted on in any carping or malignant spirit, but if we would emancipate ourselves from this thralldom it must be boldly and frankly recognised.

The ambiguity of the term "wealth" is a serious difficulty, for it has a strictly limited signification in the sphere of economics, and it is used in a far wider sense in general literature and poetry and also colloquially. In its technical meaning, wealth is that which can be recognised by law as property, either personal, or collective, which can, therefore, be made the subject of bargain and contract and which has in consequence an "exchange value." Beneficence, in a spiritual sense, is in no way involved in the conception of economic wealth, any more than the idea of true self-sacrifice can be involved in the motives of economic gain. The power of spiritual beneficence is, no doubt, stupendous in its own sphere in the determination of human welfare, but it belongs to a stratum of thought and action fundamentally distinct from that covered by the world of economics. In our dealings with one another these two strata may indeed seem to be inextricably mixed up, but with the help of a higher insight they can be distinguished, and if we are wise we should endeavour to avoid all unnecessary confusion between them. Services rendered from motives of true love, services

rendered with the spontaneous feeling and conviction that all our truest interests and ultimate ends cannot be in any sense opposed, is essentially free service. Such service is altogether unlike a business transaction, for it is not something which can be bought and sold. We are, fortunately, most of us aware, in some parts of our lives, that humanity is capable of acts of true kindness; and we know that, while such acts generally inspire a kind of reciprocity both in substance and feeling, they involve no definite provision for any return in the nature of a stipulated "consideration," or *quid pro quo*. In legal parlance they are "acts of grace," which cannot be made the subject of litigation for the enforcement either of benefits, or pains and penalties.

The aims of commerce, as commerce, are those of self-preservation and self-gratification, both in a very narrow sense; and self-aggrandisement, in a worldly sense: that is, strictly personal, or for our belongings. The methods of commerce are those of strenuous competition.

If we concentrate our energies upon commercial pursuits and deliberately adopt their

methods, aims and ideals, as our own, making them the dominant purpose and mainspring of our lives, to the neglect or subordination of our spiritual capacities and potentialities, we can, beyond doubt, achieve a certain kind of temporal success. But the spiritual side of our nature will not for ever be denied. Some crisis will arise, whether it takes the form of disease, disaster, or death, which will find us unprepared, and shatter the fabric we have made. This is no mere hypothesis, but the universal experience.

It is often urged that the two sides of our nature can be made to work hand in hand. Possibly, but the important question is: which shall be dominant? Unless we constantly keep our minds clear on this point, the risk is very great. It is easy enough to say, as many do, that we will first make our worldly position secure, and then use the vantage ground, so gained, to "do good" afterwards. A strenuous commercial life, as things are to-day, is not the best school for learning the nature of good, or high moral purpose. Many there are who learn too late that there is truth in the warning that one cannot serve both God and Mammon.

The real remedy for our ills is to be found, and found solely, in sound educational methods; and this is not possible without knowledge of the composition and working of the human mind. This knowledge must in the first instance be gained by teachers, and it must be skilfully and fearlessly applied in practice.

We have seen that, by enlarging the field of vision and consciousness, complexes can be united, resolved and co-ordinated, so extending and purifying the sphere of experience and volition, and that the real strength and greatness of individuality lie in the direction of the impersonal. These are fundamental facts handed down to us by the noblest traditions and confirmed by experimental psychological research.

The genuine understanding of these fundamental facts would lead to the remodelling and readjustment of our whole educational system. Competition, in contradistinction to emulation, as an incentive to effort (and incidentally as the great fostering cause of egoism) would be abolished. Punishment would be mitigated. Bribes would disappear. Children would be discouraged from assimilating false ideals while

their minds are young and plastic. Noble ideals would be placed before them and we should contrive and continue, by suitable examples and illustrations, to make these appear really interesting and attractive. Ideals so instilled tend to develop spontaneity of action; in a sense they become instinctive¹ and would have vastly greater weight and influence over life and conduct than mere intellectual concepts acquired later in life.

These higher instinctive aims, thoughts and feelings, ever seeking their expression in action, would, as life continues, extend their scope, strengthen their energies, and bring each individuality into more harmonious communion with other individualities, and with the outer world. The truer the instincts, the more real becomes the growth of the individuality in the direction of the impersonal.

In the incompletely developed mind, the field of vivid consciousness being necessarily narrow and circumscribed, a vast number of life's operations must pertain to the instinctive order. In psychical research these are what have been termed "automatisms." In using this term

¹ See Chapter I.

it is important to bear in mind that such instinctive acts are by no means removed from all element of responsibility. It is true, no doubt, that automatisms, while functioning, have the effect of committing the individual without his having been fully aware of what he was about. Inasmuch, however, as they were the outcome of some, it may be, innumerable conscious efforts, or musings, they must be regarded as being in fact the deferred consequences of previous volitional activity. These considerations add point to the insistence upon the value of psychological study to the healthful and systematic governance of our lives. With a proper understanding of the laws of complex formation, and of the laws which regulate their interdependence, emergence and co-ordination, a great diminution could be effected in human suffering and worry. By means of such understanding we could substitute comparatively simple and direct methods for the cumbersome experiments, failures and false inferences characteristic of the ordinary processes of social evolution.

CHAPTER V

SPECIALIZATION

THE innumerable divisions and subdivisions in the organised life of a community render some kind of specialization as regards instruction and training a virtual necessity. The various departments of State, the division of labour in productive and distributive enterprise, the growth and differentiation of professional occupations, of scientific research and recreative pursuits, all these tend to create an imperative demand for specially equipped and efficient workers, and as a consequence for "vocational training."

In recent years specialization has grown very fast and has already produced surprising results; but carried to extremes it has very serious drawbacks. For it has the effect of narrowing down the individual outlook and of isolating, or dissociating, the component parts of the social organism with the result that efficiency is, on the whole, not gained, but lost. The

pernicious craze for "record breaking"; that extravagant longing to achieve something striking, or sensational, something that will "stir the public mind" to admiration and applause, fosters a most unwholesome influence in our midst. The concentration of people's thoughts and imagination upon the ephemeral data of outward events, as though these constituted in themselves the object and goal of existence, must tend to divert attention from really important matters, to distort and confuse our sense of proportion, and make us lose sight of what is fundamentally essential to our welfare and true progress.

Not so very long ago it was very commonly held that by a vigorous application of the mind to no matter what subject, one could thereby develop certain important "faculties," which were called "*the will*," "*the memory*," "*the power of concentration*," and "*the power of observation*"; and that once gained these "faculties" could be applied to any and all purposes! Modern physiological and psychological research has utterly exploded this doctrine. Scientific research clearly indicates that observation, memory, concentration and

volition are developed only in association with specific ideas, emotions and actions; that the development of these mental powers, along certain lines, involves the development of specific portions of the brain and nervous system; and that, for the higher purposes of our communal life, or for any purpose other than those so specifically developed, these awakened powers of the mind are quite useless; unless, indeed, there is an adequate extension of the associative or assimilative processes, linking the specific complexes, so formed, with other complexes, especially with the more general or co-ordinating complexes.

An uneducated farmer, calling at a country house to obtain the signature of a local magnate to some document, was asked to wait in the library. He afterwards expressed to a friend his astonishment at the large number of "Bibles," which he had "observed," stored up on the shelves. The Family Bible was the only book with which he was familiar and it happened to have an outward resemblance to the books in the library. Hence his inference as the outcome of his "observations"! But let the owner of the library, the educated

man of affairs, quite uninstructed in practical agricultural operations, walk the fields with this man of the soil, and the tables would be turned; all his widely cultivated and scholarly powers of observation would serve him but little, and it is not unlikely that he would make just as foolish observations as that of the uncultured farmer. So it is in other fields: observation, knowledge, volition are linked with the memory of what is familiar.

“Familiarity breeds contempt” expresses only a half-truth, for familiarity also breeds affection and interest. But it is true that phenomena familiar to an expert, a specialist, may seem utterly commonplace to him and to his fellow-experts, while to a non-expert, or to an expert in another line, the same phenomena may appear to be very wonderful and mysterious, so long as they are still unfamiliar.

It is difficult, no doubt, but few things are more important in education than to bear in mind, and to inculcate, the changing nature of everything and everybody. There are conceivably different kinds of duration as well as degrees of time corresponding to our various physical and psychical phases, but nothing is

absolutely static; everything is related, conditioned and transitory. The nearest approach we can make to fixity and permanence is to be found in our enunciation of fundamental principles, or laws; nevertheless, even here it must not be forgotten that such enunciations are themselves dependent on our powers of expression and understanding; by no means immutable factors.

The common practice of labelling men according to their chief avocations is responsible for much unnecessary confusion; and it is sometimes a serious bar to our estimation of the real worth of an individual. We often hear such contemptuous exclamations as:—"What can a lawyer know about farming?" "How can a doctor make a good man of business?" "Let the shoemaker stick to his last," and the like. The idea being that competence in one special line must necessarily involve disqualification for proficiency in other directions. Generalizations of this sort are just as misleading, in their own way, as their opposite extremes, to which reference has just been made. For they leave out of account a very valuable human quality, namely versatility, which,

though often spoken of disparagingly, is essential to good citizenship. It has frequently been noticed how a first-rate lawyer, a highly skilled journalist, or a prominent statesman can, by strenuous application and a short term of study, become thoroughly expert in almost any branch of knowledge.

True versatility is acquired by the sublimation and a drastic subordination (not the repression) of the emotional element in most of the complexes. A versatile individual is one who has, in his own person, exemplified the process of co-ordination, whereby his higher complexes are developed.

CHAPTER VI

MULTIPLEX ENVIRONMENT

THE mental habit of differentiating all life's experiences into "subject" and "object," of drawing a rigid line of demarcation between these mental products, and of calling the object the "reality"—the "actual fact," as distinguished from what is supposed to represent merely transitory subjective states—is a habit which has become so deeply ingrained in the human mind, that it is difficult now-a-days to induce anyone seriously to consider a question from a different point of view. Indeed it is this deeply ingrained mental habit, with all its definitions, categories and other conventions, which forms the basis of the "exact sciences." Yet philosophically trained thinkers insist that our knowledge of matter and its qualities, our conceptions of time, space and motion, all in short that we believe concerning life, growth, form and substance, is reducible to more or less systematised mental phases, or concepts, arising out of "subject" perceptions.

It is true, no doubt, that our general powers of observation lead us to infer that every living organism is capable of experiencing such definite recurrences of psychic phases¹ with such regularity and persistency as to indicate seemingly the existence of an "environment" independent of the organism itself. We cannot properly be said to *know* the existence of anything beyond our mental states or phases. We know, in other words, the occurrence of phenomena, and we infer the laws of their relation and causation, but we do not know of their independent existence.

It is particularly important to be clear on this point, because the term *phenomenon* is now frequently used, not in its proper philosophical signification of an *appearance*, but as the equivalent of *reality*, of "the objective truth."

"The truth" is, indeed, an expression very commonly employed, though improperly. Truth is an abstraction, the discovery of which can, in a sense, be aimed at. That which we actually *find*, and which we can properly be said to *know*,

¹ It should be noted here that the phrase "psychic phase" used above does not necessarily involve such individualised developments as *consciousness* or *perception*.

is the *true*, the relation between one psychic phase and another. All this is quite elementary, but it is important to bear it in mind.

The word *know* is here used in a somewhat restricted signification, as implying an actual awareness of specific things. Undoubtedly the word is often used loosely as a substitute for *believe*, *infer*, *surmise*, and sometimes even for *fancy* or *imagine*. Such words properly denote cognitive phases of mind, involving the mere recollection of matters of which we believe vaguely that we have had or may have knowledge, but which we may have partially forgotten or lost sight of; things in short of which we are not fully and properly *aware*. Similarly, the words *real* and *reality* are ambiguous, being used sometimes merely to denote actualities in duration or time, supposed to exist apart from thought; and sometimes as the mere antithesis of false or sham. This loose and question-begging terminology represents a bad linguistic habit, having very important bearings on the problems of veracity.

What, then, we do, when we have phenomena under observation, is to differentiate or polarise

experience in accordance with well-established mental habits, and under the operation of more or less ascertainable laws of causation in mind. Individual observers, however, are not isolated, and they can, in varying degrees, share each other's experiences. It is this all important fact which is the true inwardness of the Christian saying: "We are members one of another." To use the term *mind*, in its broad signification, is to designate that power or principle which is common to all existence. Mind does not exist solely in its transitory manifestations as consciousness and perception. It is the cause of manifestation of all that is, whether we call it animate or inanimate, material or spiritual. It is the basis of all experience. The ordinary individualised mind is partly "unconscious," latent, undifferentiated; the rest is either "conscious" or "subconscious," in extent or proportion respectively, according to the individual's development, qualities and circumstance. There are, of course, as we have seen, varying kinds and degrees of the conscious and the subconscious, but what we are concerned with at the moment is the fact that a great region of mind is neither conscious nor sub-

conscious, but still is mind potentially, and the existence of which is actually felt when we engage in the operation of observing fresh phenomena. Thus "environments" are aspects of mind varying indefinitely according to their observers, whether individual or collective, according, that is to say, to the experiences through which they are evoked. There are three kinds of environment corresponding to specific experiences. These are: (1) the environment due to unconscious mind, unassimilated to individualised life and practically universal; (2) the environment due to the subconscious mind of the observers, which corresponds to the "Zeitgeist" or "Herd instinct" (somewhat of a misnomer), and it is from this kind of environment that fashions, customs and conventions have their rise; (3) the environment due to the vivid waking consciousness of individual or collective observers.

The most truly valuable of all experiences are those when all three kinds of environment are evoked, or manifest themselves, harmoniously together. That is to say, when consciousness is, so to speak, focused concentrically through them all. This form of experience is, generally

speaking, the outcome of perfect health and sanity.

Once these fundamental conceptions are grasped by the reader, he can extend, apply and illustrate their meaning by reference to his own personal experiences.

It might be objected, perhaps, that all personal experience implies the pre-existence of a separate subject or self. This objection is nothing more than a re-assertion of the determined habit of differentiating all experience into subject and object. That this habit prevails is not now in question, and there is no immediate dispute as to its fundamental importance to individual existence; but the formulation of such an objection, in a philosophical discussion, indicates the obtrusion of what may be termed an intellectual complex of a pronounced egoistic type. The formation of such complexes is one of our chief difficulties, for they may be strongly emotional as well as intellectual, and they constitute serious bars to healthy mental development. If they do not assert themselves too strongly, we are enabled to perceive that experience is not, and never can be, a simple *duality*,

consisting of subject and object only; but that in all experience there is present a third element, or aspect, or term. In other words a *knower* and a *thing known* implies *knowledge (logos)*: *perceivers* and *objects perceived* imply *perceptions*: *actors* and *things acted upon* imply *actions*. In all experiences these three terms must necessarily co-exist; and inasmuch as each term bears a determinative relation to the other two, any attempt to dissociate them, to treat any one or two of them as though they could exist apart independently, must lead to error. The slightest change in one implies a change in all. Thus a sequence of experiences, in course of time, involves a respective modification in these three variables.

When we speak of a series of "events" we make use of a customary convention which certainly suggests the fixity and independence of one element, the objective, in this trinity of experience. Similarly, when we speak of "facts" we refer to supposed actualities, circumstances, or events, considered as fixed entities complete in themselves. That this convention has great value as an expedient

for our practical convenience, in view of the well-established polarisation habits of thought, is undoubted. It is evident no less from the conflict of testimony adduced in every lawsuit; from political, scientific and religious discussions; and from that aggregation of irreconcilable data, which is compiled in the name of "history," that the convention is not only fallible in its applications, but is productive of strife and confusion.

The fact is that the actual determination of one or of two elements of this trinity of experience, isolated from the rest, is not possible, any more than it is possible to make one or two straight lines enclose a space. It is this impossible task that the human personality is ever endeavouring to accomplish. One of the results of this endeavour is the evolution and multiplication of concepts or ideas in very great variety and complexity. As humanity is at present constituted the process of concept evolution is quite necessary, and within their proper sphere of activity these concepts, various and complex, are, of course, of very great practical utility; but for man's true mental development, their subordination to the higher evolutionary

processes, both in the individual and the race, is absolutely necessary.

The cramming of the individual mind with a large number of concepts, with their names, symbols and formulae, may result in the acquisition of a specific variety of intellectual efficiency related to that system of thought to which the concepts belong; but unless there is, at the same time, an awakening of some perception of the proper limitations of such a system and of its essentially relative nature, this mental cramming will be a hindrance rather than an assistance to higher intellectual growth.

Let us take, for example, one of the most important generalizations of modern science, namely that of "energy." Energy is said to manifest itself as light, heat, mechanical work, chemical affinity, electricity, etc. Energy manifested in one form can be transmuted into its equivalent in another form and then back again into its original condition without loss. The transmission of force in railway locomotion will serve to illustrate the theory of conversion and conservation of energy. The potential chemical affinity of the fuel burned in the furnace of the engine is converted into heat. Part of this

liberated heat energy is dissipated by conduction and radiation, but is all scientifically accounted for. The remainder of the heat energy is converted into mechanical work through the expansive force of steam. This mechanical work is expended in overcoming the "inertia" of the moving mass, and at times also in overcoming the force of gravity. Ultimately, through the resistances of friction and of "concussion," the energy of mechanical motion is re-converted into heat.

From the restricted point of view of physical science, energy is constant, unchanged and unchangeable. From the point of view of psychology nothing remains the same, and all the modification in the manifestations of energy is determined by the directive powers of mind. Thus in the illustration above cited this directive power is, in great measure, our corporate intellectual life; and quite obviously it is of material importance that the mechanical energy of the moving mass should be systematically re-converted into heat through the agency of brakes, rather than through the more irregular mode of a collision!

The directive and co-ordinating powers of

mind, in the determination of the manifestations of energy, vary according to the varying forms in which life's processes are organised. Thus, in the functioning of the human organism and of animal organisms generally (viewing these primarily as vital organisms), the directive powers take the form of conscious, subconscious, or unconscious activities, usually in combination. In the functioning of vegetable life they are for the most part unconscious, but also collectively subconscious, using this term in its broadest signification. While in the mineral kingdom the directive powers, though still *mind*, are strictly unconscious. (See note 2, p. 5, Chapter I.)

We come, therefore, to the conclusion that there is a great multiplicity of "environments"; and that these exist not wholly apart from and independently of psychic phases, but as complementary to them, in *their* multiplicity. Further, that the awakening of our higher powers of synthetic understanding enables us to perceive that through their fluctuations and mutations all psychic phases, whether we regard them in the light of "environments," states of "consciousness," "subconsciousness," "unconsciousness,"

or of "concepts," are necessarily correlated and interdependent, and that they are, without exception, subject to the reign of universal laws. Hence education in essence and purpose becomes an individualised process of discovering these laws, of finding their proper interpretation in the art of living and giving them synthetic expression in the growth of character.

CHAPTER VII

RELIGIONS, IDEALS, THE TWICE-BORN

FEW subjects present greater difficulties to the art of definition than those arising out of that confused maze of conflicting ideas, customs and traditions associated with the word religion.

To say that religion is the sphere of human thought and practice, which pertains to the unmanifest side of individual and communal life, or what is usually termed the region of the "unseen," does not really carry us very far. Religion does more, it brings us in contact with those deep and intense convictions in the mind of man which have impelling forces greater in their scope and more enduring in their effects than those which arise out of physical conditions alone. These convictions are of various kinds and they impel men in different directions. They unite men into groups, they divide groups into sections, and they isolate individuals one from another. Religions, religious institutions and sects are almost innumerable. Their

existence is based upon an immense variety of seemingly incompatible traditions, customs and creeds, which in their turn are associated with all kinds of human passions—good, bad and indifferent. Further, there is no fixity in religious systems. Like physical organisms they grow in strength to fruition and then decay. One religion appears to spring from another, or its life may be enriched or impoverished by the assimilation of ideas and influences derived from several sources simultaneously.

Notwithstanding all the confusion and perplexities which surround the subject, it is possible to discern, underlying the religious history of mankind, certain clear conceptions of priceless value; conceptions as to the aims, purposes and destiny of human life; conceptions determining the emotions, conduct and language of individuals and races. All such conceptions belong properly to the domain of psychology.

It may be confidently asserted that practically every individual, with scarcely any exception, has at some time or another undergone distinct religious experiences. Experiences, that is to say, which exalt the mind to a state

of ecstasy; and whether it be the ecstasy of awe, of hope, or of rapture, such states of mind indicate for the individual his partial awakening to a perception of the real meaning of the existence to which he has been born.

William James, in that illuminating work *Varieties of Religious Experience*, has shown that there is a great similarity in the essence of these experiences, as distinguished from the mode of their separate occurrence. He contended that, in a great majority of cases, the intellectual capacity of the individuals who have these experiences is not adequate to a full and proper interpretation of their meaning; and that even when they are understood, the understanding is very rarely accompanied by the power to give such expression to their meaning in words as would carry conviction to the minds of others. Yet there is an abundance of evidence adduced, making it perfectly clear that many of the experiences belong to the same order; and that they must have been very real indeed to those who underwent them.

Several cases are cited in which a great mental revulsion takes place, a revulsion amounting to "conversion" or "change of

heart." In those so converted the whole personal outlook is radically altered; interests, tastes, aims and habits are transformed; the most intimate disposition seems to be fundamentally modified and renewed; the narrow and short-sighted self-interest, which actuates the ordinary individual life, gives place to higher human interests; the love of pleasure and gain yields to the love of truth, or, as they generally prefer to express it, to the love of God; lust, anger and pride are subdued, while the individual energies so liberated find expression in benevolent activities. But, as William James points out, these changes of character are often neither so sudden nor so radical as they appear to be.

It will be remembered that, in the first chapter, personality was compared to an iceberg. Now an iceberg, unless it happens to be stranded, is a great mass of floating ice of which a small fraction only can be seen above the surface of the water. Ordinarily speaking, we depend upon our physical powers of vision in order to determine the size, shape and position of these very formidable obstacles to safe navigation. How unreliable this dependence upon

mere eyesight can be we have learnt at severe cost.

The floating mass is continually shifting its centre of gravity. Occasionally, therefore, it happens that suddenly the visible portion disappears from view, and another portion, or it may be several portions simultaneously, emerges from invisible depths. Similarly what might be described as the centre of force in one's personality is subject, on occasion, to rapid and momentous changes of position in relation to the correlated system of complexes out of which the personality is composed. It is just these sudden changes in the centre of force which are often spoken of as "conversion." Those portions of personality emerging from the subconscious in our altered condition are not, in fact, newly created entities, they are merely transposed, and thus, for the time being, rendered dominant. What is more, the new position may resemble one of "unstable equilibrium," and it even suggests, to those who take a too rigid view of a fixed hypothetical self, a want of genuineness in the conversion. A careful investigation of a large number of cases led William James to the conclusion nevertheless

that simulation was not the true explanation of the changed life which followed upon conversion.

The true explanation is briefly this: certain ideas, corresponding to what may be called the religious beliefs of others, are assimilated intellectually by an individual. These ideas become familiar, in a kind of unattached irresponsible manner, to a group of complexes which, linked together for practical purposes, constitute the normal waking personality; but the emotions properly associated with these ideas belong to another group of complexes which are, for the time being, instinctive, subconscious, or latent; and to this group they gravitate and with it they coalesce. This process continues until this latter group has gained sufficient inherent strength, aided perhaps by some special outward circumstances, to force its emergence into vivid consciousness.

It is obvious that such spasmodic conversions have their drawbacks; and that the steady persistent growth of high character is far preferable. If one might venture upon an extension of the iceberg simile, a permanent change of heart would be comparable to the

actual melting of the ice itself, so that its waters may combine freely with the waters of the ocean.

This last suggestion brings us to a point of great importance, namely, the extremely limited value of all imagery, and the great danger involved in dwelling upon a supposed analogy, which, though it may offer some passing help in the effective expression of an idea, cannot be properly regarded as the only symbol conveying that idea, or true for all time. More especially is this the case when we are endeavouring to explain some aspect of a process deep and far-reaching as is the growth and evolution of human individuality.

Images, phrases and formulas, which have been either invented or evolved for the purpose of conveying great truths, are undoubtedly quite necessary as educational instruments. But the inveterate tendency of the human mind to dwell needlessly upon such instruments inverts their proper relation in thought to the truths they are intended to teach; and hence there arise all the evils of dogmatism and idolatry. A well-made scaffolding, erected upon a sound system, is a useful contrivance for enabling us to build

a great edifice, but if we forget the purpose for which the scaffolding was contrived and so erect it that its subsequent removal would endanger the stability of the edifice itself, it will readily be seen that it was not fulfilling its proper function. The application of this principle to education may not be quite so obvious, but it can hardly be less important. Creeds, conventions and traditions, by long use and familiarity, breed in the mind of man egoistic affections and attachments. These, with their restricting influence upon perception and volition, bar the way to spiritual growth and understanding. In this way the vehicles, instruments, servants and friends, created by man for his higher purposes and ends, tend to become his most formidable obstacles and his deadliest foes.

What is a true ideal? Can it exist apart from the vehicle through which it finds access to the human mind? This is a difficult metaphysical problem and it is not necessary to solve it here. But perhaps the best way of dealing with it, is to show that practically the same ideal may be found embodied in a great variety of different dresses and shapes. This is the

province of comparative religion and philosophy; and already much excellent educational work has been done in its fields.

In the framing of ideals, and in order to make sure that they are really true and likely to be helpful towards furthering the perfection of mankind, it is important, in the first place, to form some clear conceptions as to the goal towards which humanity is tending. As to this, there seem to be prevalent two sets of ideals opposed to one another. In both human happiness is the goal. According to one set of ideals the world is to be made a better place to live in. Our notions of what is good for us are to be accepted as practically fixed; circumstances and conditions are to be adjusted to suit them. According to the opposite set of ideals we must take the world as it is, call it "Nature" and adapt our tastes and notions to suit it! It will be surmised from a perusal of the preceding pages that, according to the psychological view, both sets of ideals are equally fallacious. Happiness can only be real and lasting when we have entirely overcome that grasping attitude of mind which seeks to fix either mental disposition or environment as

being capable of maintaining respectively permanent independence apart from one another.

It is the conquest of this grasping disposition of heart and mind which is the true meaning and implication of the process of being "born again in the spirit." All ideals conducing towards the attainment of this blessed state are, therefore, from a religious point of view, worthy and noble; all others are false and misleading.

Further, the *way* or *path* towards the attainment of this state, though accompanied by higher instinctive efforts, is essentially a *rational* way, using the term rational in contradistinction to mere intellectualism based upon the formation and arrangement of concepts. It is thus a process of rationalising instincts, subordinating those of reproduction and preservation to those innate spiritual tendencies which make for human perfection or wholeness. Mere devotion to noble ideals is not sufficient. New and keener mental powers and faculties must be developed and maintained. Mere repression is useless. No part of our nature can be ignored in the spiritual process. The lower instincts have to be *sublimated*, not denied. The errors which

arise from complex dissociations, however slight, must be overcome, the perverted beliefs and cravings engendered by such dissociations, the false notions of fixity, permanence and universality in the concepts obtaining in such complexes must all be re-coordinated or resolved. The emotions allied to the minor and intermediate complexes must be purified and exalted and their energies redirected, so that they can find outlet and expression in harmony with the growth of the Great Complex. Unless this is thoroughly accepted and understood, the individual can never gain any lasting confidence and security. The process is called painful, but although it is true that great suffering is involved, the pain which has to be endured is more than counterbalanced by the joy of achievement, and is ever diminishing in intensity.

In our efforts towards perfection there must be true self-examination; not mere intellectual introspection. The recorded wisdom of our predecessors, and that of contemporary thinkers, is certainly of some avail, but each individual must rely chiefly upon his own inward efforts to break that crusted mass of ignorance,

preconception and prejudice which we all inherit. If in the end one finds that these efforts and the glorified traditions of the past are really identical in purpose, the actual discovery of this identity and the realisation of its truth is part of the process which each individual must necessarily undergo for himself.

Then can we not help one another? Yes, surely. As William James points out in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*, the practice of "confession" may have very great value psychologically, provided the confessor has a large and well-equipped mind, which unfortunately is not usually the case. He should be thoroughly well versed in psychology, and he should be possessed of more than an average knowledge of the affairs of the world. He should also be sincere, kind-hearted, disinterested and, above all, he should be endowed with a large fund of common sense. The "professional"¹ confessor is rarely so equipped, and,

¹ The word *professional* is ambiguous. Its use above implies the presence of the commercial element, i.e. work done for a "consideration," or an occupation in pursuit of a "living." William James contrasts professional work with that of the amateur, as involving in the former case greater regard to *method* and in the latter case a regard

consequently, the operation in his hands may be worse than useless.

It often happens, at the present time, that those in trouble fall back on the doctor or the lawyer for advice and guidance. Is it too much to hope that some day, in the distant future, the properly qualified doctor, surgeon, lawyer and teacher may each and all of them combine in themselves the highest functions of both priest and healer?

Careless or unskilled discussions may sometimes have the effect of awakening the great complex, the whole personality; especially if it has been awakened before, or even if it has previously been on the verge of an awakening. More often such discussions, when they effect a change in the point of view, have merely been instrumental in altering the field of consciousness by bringing another unimportant complex into the focus of awareness.

As indicated in Chapter IV, great importance attaches to the development of higher incentives to effort. How often we repeat or refer to the

mainly to *results*. The suggestion in the text is that proficiency in both these respects is dependent upon knowledge and upon untrammelled beneficence.

“Sermon on the Mount,” and pay lip service to its beauty and its truth! But what is its true meaning? “A counsel of perfection” is the glib official reply. Certainly, but has it no practical value, and, if so, what is it intended to convey? Restated in cold prosaic language, the lesson there inculcated urges us to rely less upon the seen, the concrete, the physically tangible; and more upon the spiritual side of our natures, unmanifest to our senses, but none the less real and permanent. We are there told on authority that by this way we gain true security and everlasting peace.

That this teaching is in strict accord with the conclusions of recent psychological research, it is one of the objects of these pages to point out.

CHAPTER VIII

PERFECTION AS THE IDEAL AND LESSONS OF THE WAR

PERFECTION is the highest Ideal, the ultimate goal. Although colloquially it is often an appreciative expression merely, or a mere mark of high approbation, needless to say that perfection means properly a condition of things which can by no possibility be improved upon. In its true sense perfection is rarely thought of seriously as a practical ideal, much less is it to be met with in actual life. Applied to human personality it implies not only excellence of quality, but absolute completeness as to individual development and capacity in every respect. It implies complete knowledge, which is indistinguishable from complete faith, for no incomplete knowing or believing can ever be perfect knowledge or belief. It implies complete power, in that a perfect individual would never try to do or have the least wish to do anything that he was unable to accomplish. It implies absolute

sincerity, for perfection is altogether incompatible with untruthfulness or any effort to deceive. It implies unlimited patience, for there could be with perfection neither false expectations nor the desire to obtain results before they are properly due. In the same way it implies absolute kindness, wisdom and understanding.

All this is fairly obvious and mainly matter of verbal definition; yet how often do we hear men blamed because in certain respects they have fallen short of perfection! The fact is that most of us are much too fond of setting up impossible standards or at least of imposing arbitrary and impracticable ideals for the regulation of one another's conduct.

We have dealt in a previous chapter with "reality" and "fact," but the use of these words has an important bearing on the present issue. We have seen that "reality" and "fact" are often mere question-begging terms purporting to fix some permanent value to phenomena; and that, except within specific systems involving definite preconceptions as to what is or is not manifest through the senses, this use of the words has not even the excuse of convenience. The only true facts pertaining

to the ideal are the laws of individual existence. The estimation of ideals cannot, therefore, be dealt with according to strictly inductive methods of reasoning. The ordinary laws of evidence and proof are not applicable to the determination of their value, except in so far as they may help towards their verification and elucidation. Ideals are based primarily upon insight and intuition.

The pursuit of perfection requires, undoubtedly, the tentative formulation of noble ideals, that is to say of those crystalline glimpses of the direction in which the true goal lies; but the danger of all such formulations is that they are apt to be mistaken for the goal itself.

The Great War has been to a world, striving indeed for the most part to do what is right, a profound revelation of the vast extent of human imperfection. This is the chief lesson to be learned from the War, and one that must be learned thoroughly before we can hope to arrive at any sound estimate of the outcome of this world-wide strife, or find the solutions of the vexed problems of fixing its causes and determining the burden of ultimate responsibility. In our examinations of such questions

few have learned as yet how to distinguish what is essential from what is not essential, or how to avoid the confusion of one with the other. This confusion is not merely verbal, or one of mere technical definition. It is fundamental, and gives rise to much bitter controversy on questions of methods and ideals. Thus we find that there are different, not to say diametrically opposed, ways by which the striking events of life may be considered. They may be considered superficially, or as we often say "practically," from the point of view of materialistic habits of thought, or else they may be considered with a view to the deeper spiritual aspects of life. There is also the middle course; where events are examined simultaneously from both points of view in their proper relationship and true perspective. In the Buddhist scriptures a story is related of how a dying father told his son to avoid looking at things "either from too far or too near": wise advice, much neglected at the present time.

Let us endeavour to examine the problem of the responsibility for the War from all these aspects. First let us try to define what we

mean by a state of war. Similes taken from natural phenomena may be helpful. The surface of the earth is continually changing by processes known to the student of physical and biological sciences, but, except for the ordinary seasonal changes, the alterations in the conformation and composition of the earth's crust are so gradual as to suggest to uninstructed observers the appearance of fixity and permanence. Occasionally, however, it happens that the cumulative effects of pent-up energies, breaking loose from a state of unstable equilibrium, produce such violent and sudden rearrangements in the outward conformation and condition of visible things as to give rise to a belief in the operation of entirely new and unforeseeable agencies. Among such exceptional phenomena are storms, floods, land-slides, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and epidemics. In the light of modern science, however, no greater mystery surrounds these exceptional occurrences than that which accompanies normal life in the mind of enlightened and thoughtful people.

So it is with the outbreak of war.

Civil law, through which we manage and

regulate our collective relationships in times of peace, is based upon the expectation of a more or less continuous flow of the petty forces of our social and industrial activities. At best it is but the embodiment of some rough generalizations as to the way in which our established customs and beliefs should or are supposed to operate in the ordinary life of a community. It is true that of recent years there has grown up a body of thought styled "international law," intended to govern a theoretical community of all nations. Great as may be the promise and hope founded upon this legal growth of thought, it can hardly be said, as yet, to have emerged from its elementary stages, and its serious students are few and far between. Now the civil law of a nation, although modified and adjusted by periodic acts of legislation, and changing also through desuetude in the lapse of time, can never be properly described as a perfect expression or mirror of the actual needs, feelings and aspirations of a progressive people. This being the case, all nations are confronted from time to time with manifestations of sectional discontent, culminating in revolt, with greater

or less violence and frequency, according to the wisdom of rulers, the elasticity of legal provisions and the character and resourcefulness of the people. It is not surprising, therefore, to find wide differences, even of a fundamental nature, in the civil law of various nations. These differences depend not only upon the geographical, climatic, political and religious conditions of their respective populations, but on their temperamental qualities, whether active or latent.

These differences in the character and conditions of nations are of course liable to clash through the operations of opposing political interests and trade rivalries; and when such clashing occurs, appeal is, in the first instance, made to the nebulous provisions of international law. But, as already indicated, its provisions are often inadequate. The reason of this inadequacy is really not far to seek. The study of psychology gives us a clue. As humanity is constituted the emotional qualities of mind, i.e. our likes and dislikes, our interests and cravings, determine, in great measure, our beliefs, opinions and "convictions" as to what is right and what is true. This applies not

only to individuals, but to groups, or combinations of individuals, united for a common purpose. A national crisis invariably tends to bring about unity within the nation of its interests and convictions. This unity in crises is a strange conglomeration of panic, pride, ill-will and national enthusiasm, which passes, for want of a better word, as "patriotism." Failure in the adjustment of differences between nations through diplomatic appeals to international law precipitates a state of war.

All impartial observers of the present world-crisis are agreed that Great Britain, loyally supported by France, Russia, Serbia and Italy, made most determined and persistent appeals, through proper diplomatic channels, to international law in its endeavours to bring about a peaceful solution, or, failing that, some provisional adjustment which would give opportunity and scope to the healing operations of time. That this is a correct diagnosis is supported by the practically unanimous attitude of sympathy shown by all neutral Powers, as well as that of the British and the Allies' dominions and colonial dependencies throughout the world.

With the outbreak of war every belligerent nation goes through a remarkable transformation. Whatever may be the case, *theoretically*, in times of peace, at the first signs of war the whole population becomes suddenly awakened to the supremacy of the State, or, as they say in India, the *Sarkar*. Civil law is in many ways superseded by martial law. The Government assumes new powers, a widened and more arbitrary authority. In our case Parliament has sanctioned the enactment of new laws, valid for the duration of the war, which modify in the most fundamental manner personal rights, the rights of property and the liberty of speech. These laws were passed without delay, without opposition, and practically without discussion! The changes wrought by the War in the condition of Great Britain are far more dramatic and spectacular than those which took place in Germany and Austria, particularly the former. For in Prussianised Germany, where military and autocratic rule has always been more or less normal, the ideals and methods of government during peace are widely different from our own. This fact brings us close to the main issues of

responsibility. The dominant governing power and authority in Germany is in the hands of what is called "Prussian Junkerdom." It is the rule of an aristocratic and military caste. Its ideal is the supremacy of and reverence for physical force. It involves the organised subordination of individual rights and interests to the supposed needs of the State, as determined by privileged classes, social and economic. With us the State is the synthetic expression of the considered aims and wishes of the whole community. If the Government of the day fails to give adequate expression to this synthesis, it is changed. Our constitution may be far from perfect in its practical working, but that, at any rate, is the ideal which animates it. Public opinion with us is a real force, the ultimate determining power; but in the German Empire public opinion must either conform to an arbitrary Government authority or be suppressed. It is not, of course, to be assumed that Germany has an absolute monopoly of the Prussian Junkerdom spirit: for indeed that spirit is to be found widely distributed throughout the world. Many individuals everywhere, and many communities, pass through phases

of its baneful influence. It does not follow, however, that because that spirit is to be seen active, or its latent existence felt, it need always prevail and dominate; nor is it true, as often suggested, that anyone is necessarily hypocritical for the reason that, while he is himself tainted with its virus, he, at the same time, repudiates it as an *ideal*. Here then, possibly, we have a solution of the problem of responsibility. The German nation was so much imbued with the lust of dominion and the belief in its own superiority that it could not, as a nation, co-operate amicably with other nations, granting to all a share of what it claimed for itself.

It is to be hoped that this appalling war, with all its horrible devastation, will at least have this good to its credit, that it will result in the subjugation, if not the final laying, of that pestilent spirit of physical dominion and avarice for many a long year to come.

Let us, however, avoid as far as we can falling into the grave error of self-righteousness—of becoming too complaisant and optimistic. Wherever one looks, human nature, in its existing stages of development, is very far

from perfect, and, recognising this fact, let us avoid all unnecessary harshness of criticism—that pernicious habit of hastily forming arrogant judgments, based upon a superficial survey of outward events. “Ideals” we all have, but few of them are worthy of being lived up to, and many of us have from time to time a jumble of conflicting “ideals,” both true and false. It is easy enough to find fault, for while an “ideal” holds us, our emotional natures blind us not only to our own shortcomings but to the relatively true value of other “ideals” with which we happen for the time being to be out of harmony. We often pride ourselves on our “consistency,” but who is there truly consistent other than the absolutely perfect man? Some are apt to forget, too, that it is better to be inconsistent, with occasional lapses into virtue and modesty, than to be consistent in the determined pursuit of false ideals.

APPENDIX

A REPLY TO CRITICS

EXTRACTS FROM SOME COMMENTS AND
CRITICISMS, WITH NOTES BY THE AUTHOR

The Purpose of Education was published a few months prior to the war, and was beginning to receive wide attention at home and abroad. On the whole I had reason to be well satisfied with the quality of this attention, though it did not survive the outbreak of hostilities. The effects of education on the character and condition of peoples have been constantly referred to by various authorities; but unfortunately these effects are still so far from being obvious that the first outcome of the great international convulsion was the diversion of public interest from all such matters, as being irrelevant, or at any rate as having no immediate cogency. Consequently all interest in my endeavours in this direction seemed suddenly to disappear; and it is only quite recently that there are any signs of a revival of that interest.

Since my book appeared I have received many appreciative letters from eminent

authorities, and many highly eulogistic reviews have been printed in all sorts of periodicals.

In the extracts given below I have omitted many passages which might have been quoted by way of testimonial, but I cannot refrain from mentioning here, with special gratification, as coming from so high an authority, the following sentences taken from one of Dr John Adams' letters, which I have dealt with further on: "I referred to the book in my lecture to teachers to-day, and I shall deal with it more fully in my University lectures. You have done an excellent bit of work in presenting the case so clearly. Wishing the book the success its matter and style certainly deserve...."

The chief criticism I have met with is that, owing to the novelty and difficulty of the subject, the book is much too short. Yet curiously enough, several of my reviewers have found in it nothing new whatever! That I have succeeded in pleasing a large number, possibly a great majority, of my readers is certain, but I must admit that a few have been made quite angry by their perusal. The reason of this I have tried to explain in a subsequent note. Their criticisms have been ill-natured and captious, and are not, as a rule, deserving of anxious consideration.

If through this enlarged and revised edition it is my good fortune to obtain important

additions to the number of my helpful critics, I shall later on attempt a considerable expansion of the theme.

Dr John Adams, LL.D., Professor of Education, University of London, and Principal of London Day Training College, writes:

...Yours is the first educational work to introduce boldly the newer ideas regarding consciousness and mind. I do not think that educational people are ready yet to accept your fundamental view—particularly in the extreme form suggested in your sentence on the Mineral Kingdom in the middle of p. 70. The ordinary reader will certainly want to know more about your use of the word *mind*. I am at present busily thrashing out—not for publication but for my students—the problem of “the portals of consciousness,” so I welcome your contribution.

In a second letter Dr Adams says:

...The great charm of your little book is that you have made it individual. The points to which I should personally like you to give your attention are (1) What, under the Austrian view, is the value of consciousness? (2) How is the educator to get at the seething reservoir of the unconscious so as to manipulate it in education? (3) The relation between determinism and the newer psychological views you expound—and the relation of both to practical education?

In his very kind and appreciative letters, Dr Adams writes under a slight misapprehension. I have not attempted to follow the psychology of Dr Sigmund Freud and his school, or what Dr Adams calls the “Austrian

view." I fully recognise the importance of this school's researches, but I reject many of their conclusions. I even use the term "complex" in a somewhat different sense from theirs; and I also believe the conceptions underlying my use of the word are more in accord with those of other and perhaps more distinguished investigators of abnormal psychology.

In regard to Dr Adams' various points, I have made an attempt in this new edition to elucidate some of the points to which he refers. I might add here, however, that "Determinism" itself has frequently such confused and ambiguous implications, that I have avoided all reference to it as a formal system. If it means merely the recognition of *causation* in the determination of phenomena, discriminating for the most part between cause and occasion, I must, of course, admit its relevance to psychological considerations. If, however, it means that we are all involved, with everything else, in an absolutely "necessary," fixed and unalterable course of "objective" events, I reject it, without hesitation. Briefly stated, the views I have endeavoured to uphold admit *causation* as an *expression* of the spatial and chronological aspect of all phenomenal relations; but these relations become less and less exact, measurable and determinate (in the spatial and chrono-

logical sense) as *mind* becomes less and less differentiated in its upward activity (or should I say relative *inactivity*?) towards the syntheses and sublimations of what I have called the "great complex." My contention is that "action," "motion" and "work" have no *absolute* meaning, no meaning at all, in other words, apart from their definite relations in specific systems of thought. I do not wish to suggest that this is a new view, only that in philosophical discussions it is sometimes obscured. As regards practical education, I would point out that my immediate theme is *purpose* rather than *method*, though I recognise that the one is involved in the other. I insist, however, that purpose should properly come first; and that one cannot advantageously discuss "method" until "purpose" is at least provisionally settled.

The Times (6th Jan. 1914), in an article entitled "Life and Environment," discusses the book as follows:

Mr Pitt is not concerned with any narrow question of scholastic function, but with the broadest issues of all—what life means, and what, as a consequence, education, as a training for life, should take as its aim. His effort is throughout towards that reconciliation of the current antithesis between the importance of the inner life and that of environment which is to be found in a higher synthesis holding

each in its true relations and avoiding the exaggeration of either. This is emphatically the task which educational theory has to face. No mere ignoring of contradictory conceptions as to the value of life, leading to a collection of unsolved inconsistencies both in doctrine and in practice, can advance the work on which the progress of humanity largely depends. In most books on education we seek in vain for any recognition that there is such a problem to be faced. It is because Mr Pitt takes it as his subject throughout that we have read his book with both pleasure and profit, and have sincerely regretted that it is not longer. In many places the theme was worthy of fuller and more explicit development, especially the consideration of the noble, impersonal ideals the cultivation of which is the real work of education. But even where most concise, the treatment is always suggestive, and one finds oneself starting off continually on a mental excursion of development and application—which is, doubtless, just as the author would have it.

Mr Pitt extends “mind” as widely as possible, so as to embrace inorganic as well as organic existence. The philosophical implications of this are not worked out, and, as a consequence, the presentation of the doctrine of interaction with environment suffers in point of clearness. With the main thesis advocated we are in hearty agreement, and the presentment we have found suggestive and stimulating in no ordinary degree. The perusal of the book could hardly fail to be profitable to any thoughtful man or woman, and not simply to those who are engaged in the work of teaching.

I readily admit that there are objections to the use of the word “mind” in a widely extended sense. My main purpose in so using it was to avoid, as far as possible, the confusions

which have resulted from the terminology of the current systems of animistic dualism, on the one hand, and materialistic or idealistic monism, on the other.

One review in *Mind* (July 1914) is an apt illustration of the working of those strongly emotional preconceptions which are dealt with in the book, and as a criticism is feeble and unfair. In order to avoid the same fault, let me quote the review in full:

The sub-title of this little book is *an examination of the education problem in the light of recent psychological research*, but neither the title nor the sub-title find justification in the contents of the book.

There is very little in its pages which can be said to throw light on the purpose of education, and very little which can be said to reflect the results of recent psychological research....

Almost the only direct reference to modern psychology occurs on page 4, and a few following pages where the author develops the statement: "the study of modern psychology has shown that the mind is composed of a vast number and great variety of psycho-physical complexes."

Not much value can be attached to a book where two such contradictory statements as the following are made within a few pages:

(1) Page 22. "One of the most important facts, which the investigations of modern psychology have revealed, is the extremely limited range of choice in the determination of his conduct, which falls to the lot of the average child, or indeed, for that matter, of the average human being."

(2) Page 19. "It is quite certain that an individual's tastes, that is to say, his likes and dislikes, his aims and preferences, are not fixed and unchangeable elements, but that they are qualities which can be cultivated, repressed and developed within a wide range of limits."

If a man's "likes and dislikes, aims and preferences" are largely responsible for his conduct the contradiction between the above statements cannot be got over.

On page 52 we have an illustration of careless use of language unworthy of a serious book. "Children," writes the author, "would be discouraged from assimilating false ideals....Nobler ideals would be placed before them....Ideals so instilled tend to become *instinctive*." On the next page we find a similar reference to "higher *instinctive* aims," and to "*truer instincts*" which shows that the writer has not realised what "instincts" and "instinctive" mean.

The two passages quoted from pp. 22 and 19 (first edition), and wrenched from their context with a view of showing a hopeless contradiction, are in no way incompatible. The reviewer's remarks merely indicate his incapacity to distinguish between an "individual" and "the average human being." His other comments and quotations, purporting to find fault with my use of the word "*instinctive*," show that he has not read the book intelligently. In the first chapter I have argued that "*instinct*," representing race experience acting spontaneously through the

stimulus of environment, cannot be fundamentally different from individual experience, when it acts spontaneously, inasmuch as the two kinds of experience must be dependent the one upon the other; and that, although the distinction may have practical convenience when dealing with the question of responsibility, there can be no absolute difference in their respective functioning.

It is no doubt correct to say that a careless terminology is a serious bar to right understanding, but a slavish belief in the fixed meaning of words is an even more serious bar. This is indeed the most difficult obstacle to be overcome in dealing with ill-instructed minds, and it is an attitude to which German types of thought are particularly prone! It unfortunately happens that many words in current use have varying degrees of ambiguity, but generally with care their meaning appears clearly enough through the context in which they occur. It is, however, a common trait with pedantic and pretentious people to insist that words can only have the single definite meanings which appear to them correct at the moment. Improvements in our nomenclatures, the need for which will be readily admitted, depend upon clear thinking, not upon arbitrary definitions. Definitions, or memorised labels, purport to be cold static

entities, but, as their users are never quite unemotional, each label tends to develop by use into a species of psychic fetish. This is the great vice of the so-called scientific method, which pretends to be quite free and unemotional. I have endeavoured to show that true freedom is the absence of all emotional conflict—an ideal condition, rarely met with in controversy.

This letter from Dr T. Percy Nunn, M.A., D.Sc. (Lond.), Vice-Principal of London Day Training College, has led to further correspondence, and in conversation Dr Nunn has admitted that our differences were mainly, if not wholly, verbal. I have, however, made some alterations in the text to meet his objections.

...There must be a great many thinking people whose ideas about the purpose of education will be enriched by what you have said. Of course I do not go all the way with you—one never does that. In particular, as one of the small but growing band of "new realists," I resent your assumption that we only know states of consciousness, and particularly of course your assumption that it is not an assumption but a mere statement of the facts as they reveal themselves to the intellect emancipated from the vulgar point of view! But like so many other metaphysical differences, this one has practically no bearing, so far as I can see, on practical consequences, and with the practical consequences which you draw I am in the fullest sympathy.

Miss Jane Barlow, Litt.D., reviewing *The Purpose of Education* in the *Journal of the Society for Psychical Research*, says:

The object of this little volume, as summed up at its close, is to point out that the teaching which urges less reliance upon "the seen, the concrete, the physically tangible, and more upon the spiritual side of our nature," is "in strict accord with the conclusions of recent psychological research." In the Preface, one of its main objects is said to be the indication of a path midway between those extreme views which exaggerate respectively the importance of the inner life and of the environment. And yet another object, less explicitly stated, is to denounce that short-sighted utilitarian outlook, which in education "draws the circle premature, heedless of far gain." Such a denunciation seems indeed to be invited by the present time, when this bad bargain is so often struck as a means to the end of "getting and spending." The author's protest is nowise too strong, but would perhaps have been more effectively made in language less elaborately technical. The word "complex," for instance, a term which, according to the definition on pages 4 and 5, covers almost all mental processes, casts an obscurity over some passages where its use, despite his apologies for it, might with advantage have been avoided.

There is no ambiguity, however, about the expression of his belief that our age suffers from many ills, a remedy for which must be "found, and found solely, in sound educational methods"; but which have by their evil influence on education made its reform at once difficult and indispensable. Prominent among these contemporary ills we find an assumption "that the 'struggle for life' is a financial struggle

pure and simple," based on the delusion that "money is an universal power, meeting all human needs," and closely connected with an excessive regard for reputation rather than character, resulting in "a most deplorable waste of human energy in the vain attempt of individuals, groups, classes and nations to maintain their position in the eyes of the world." The effects upon education are obvious in its commercial aims and methods, always strictly personal and strenuously competitive, in the substitution of lower for higher motives and ideals, and in the common neglect to provide for any systematic training of instincts and character.

"One of the most noticeable consequences of the neglect of such systematic training is to be seen in the mental habit of impatience with outward conditions; that exaggerated longing for the immediate emergence of tangible results from all efforts and actions, a longing which often finds expression in a futile and vulgar utilitarianism." There is, in short, a tendency to the "inversion of the proper relations of the inward and outward, of means and end, that is responsible for the pernicious custom, widely prevalent, of neglecting, not to say ignoring, the importance of character training."

But "the difficulty of the educational problem, which presents itself when we endeavour to inculcate the superiority of character to reputation, lies in the fact that the early stages of child-development depend so largely on the feeding and cultivation of the minor complexes, in which narrow egocentric thoughts and feelings must necessarily predominate. The problem then assumes this form: How are we to counteract these budding and multifarious egoisms in the minor complexes without destroying all incentives to effort?" The solution is thus stated: "We have seen that by enlarging the field of vision and consciousness, complexes can be united, resolved,

and co-ordinated, so extending the sphere of experience and volition, and that the real strength and greatness of individuality lies in the direction of the impersonal. These are fundamental facts handed down to us by the noblest traditions, and confirmed by experimental psychological research.

"The genuine understanding of these fundamental facts would lead to the remodelling and readjustment of our whole educational system. Competition as an incentive to effort (and incidentally as the great fostering cause of egoism) would be abolished. Punishment would be mitigated. Bribes would disappear. Children would be discouraged from assimilating false ideals while their minds are young and plastic. Noble ideals would be placed before them, and we would contrive by suitable examples and illustrations to make these appear really interesting and attractive."

All this applies mainly to the ethical element in education. With reference to the much-needed "awakening to some higher faith in the purpose and destiny of individual existence," the author asks: "How is this possible without a serious effort being made to introduce a really moral and religious atmosphere into popular education?" He clearly uses the word "religious" in the widest and least dogmatic sense; yet, even allowing for this, the following statement, which occurs in the chapter on Religion, Ideals, and Conversion, seems somewhat too sweeping: "It may be confidently asserted that practically every individual, with scarcely any exception, has at some time or another undergone distinct religious experiences. Experiences, that is to say, which exalt the mind to a state of ecstasy; and whether it be the ecstasy of awe, of hope, or of rapture, such states of mind indicate for the individual his partial awakening to a perception of the real meaning of the existence to which he has been born." Either

the universality or the intensity of such experiences must surely be overstated.

In the same chapter, too, occur some remarks about confession and confessors, which might at a first glance be misinterpreted; they resolve themselves however into the proposition that good advice is useful and rare; a conclusion with which most people will agree.

Miss Barlow's objection to the use of the word "complex" is excusable, because it is still unfamiliar. But is the objection reasonable? Is it anything more than mere prejudice? We must have a word to connote those recurrent, intermittent and persistent ego-centric mental phases, the functioning of which has done so much to explain and simplify, as well as mystify, the psychic processes made manifest in personality. Herbart's phrase "apperception masses" is certainly not preferable. *Spirit* and *Soul* are ambiguous and both much discredited. *Mood* is too vague, so are *memory* and *motive*. What serious objection is there to *complex*? It has already come into use, and it is readily adopted as soon as it ceases to sound unfamiliar.

I venture to suggest that had Miss Barlow been less disinclined to accept the genuineness of complex functioning, she would have had no difficulty in believing what I have said about religious experiences. For such events may at times seem to have been completely

“forgotten” and yet continue to have an important influence on our lives.

In this very interesting letter from an old and valued friend the terminological difficulty is raised in a somewhat acute form :

My dear FOX PITT,—On the whole—with a reservation, however, as to the meaning or definition of human personality—I agree with the view you take of life’s purpose and of education as a means towards its development and of the aims to be set before us in these its initial stages. But I think that instead of “complex,” which I should like to keep as a characteristic adjective, I would use the word Vision to indicate the states of mind and mood in which vision plays for most of us so conspicuous a part; and I would imagine our approximate goal to be a vision of the Universe as it extends in all its “complexity” in space and time, with all its accompanying emotions, and progress to be our successive apprehensions of it in the successive visions or, to use your word, “complexes,” which you describe as minor, intermediate, and great. Of course the mind first and, perhaps, last can “envisage circumstance” only in patches and whilst one is “on view” the rest are submerged or potential only: but the mind when viewing patches should, I think, tend to make even them wholes in the same way that the poet isolates and organises successive and simultaneous experiences into poems.

I agree also that as the visions extend towards infinitude or the “great complex,” the desire for “possessions” within the limited area of reality slackens and morality becomes implicit again, the affections being transferred to ideas and ideals which

transcend both law and morality, that in fact the "economic basis" is the foundation of the minor and intermediate complexes only, and is absorbed into or vanishes in the higher, in the great.

All hail then to the Vision—that Vision of order touched with Beauty, may I say, spoken of by the Prophet as that without which the people perish: and all hail to your little book which points towards it as the goal of all our education (or as the purpose of all high education).

Yours very truly,

T. J. CORDEN-SANDERSON.

"Vision" expresses one of a complex's manifold phases. A complex is at once the embodiment, potentiality, continuity, cause and outcome of specific experience. It is sometimes the equivalent of what we vaguely call a habit; its essential mark, however, is its power, latent or active, of generating a feeling of definite self-hood. It is just because all complex *subjects* can be postulated as *objects* of thought that they cannot be properly regarded as ultimate, permanent and unconditioned.

Dr F. H. Hayward, D.Litt., writes as follows, in the *Moral Education League Quarterly*:

Under Mr Fox Pitt's system "children would be discouraged from assimilating false ideals while

their minds are young and plastic. Noble ideals would be placed before them, and we would continue by suitable examples and illustrations to make these appear interesting and attractive. Ideals so instilled tend to become instinctive."

Here is the plea for explicit moral instruction based on a faith in the power of ideas and ideals.

The book is largely Herbartian in spirit (though with a terminology that may present some difficulties to the unwary reader), for Mr Fox Pitt tells us a great deal about mental "complexes," which are evidently much the same as Herbart's "apperception masses." Complexes, to be efficient, must be mobile, "not charged too strongly with the tenacity of emotion which tends to restrict and obstruct the reception of new ideas."

In other respects, the book reminds us of Mr Holmes's onslaught on human egoism. "It is only when the egotistic feeling is in abeyance that we can truly be said to love." The sense of separateness of one individual from another must be broken down, and this is only possible by means of education. But Mr Fox Pitt is free from the excesses that, rightly or wrongly, one associates with the Holmes-Montessori movement. "We are now confronted with some very extravagant claims as to the rights of Children." Habits can be easily formed, but cannot so easily be eradicated.

Crammed as this book is with sound wisdom, it would be more effective if three times the size, if, that is to say, its ideas were worked out into their ramifications and applications. But we must be thankful for it as it is, and the reviewer, for one, congratulates Mr Fox Pitt on a work that is more level-headed than those usually coming from the educational press, and is written in a style that betokens a scholar and a thinker.

Mr Cloudesley Brereton writes as follows in *The Quest* :

Mr Fox Pitt has performed a public service in applying the results of recent Psychological Research to an analysis of some of the problems of modern society and in particular to a classification of the purposes of education. He refuses, on the one hand, to accept the doctrine of original sin and, on the other, the theory of the child's fundamental goodness, so dear to Rousseau. For him personality is a *complexus* of variegated fluctuating psychical phases and potentialities. Like an iceberg this *complexus* is ever changing in structure and substance, and the greater part of its bulk, which corresponds to the subliminal self, is always submerged and invisible. The mind itself is made up of three types of complexes : minor, which correspond to personal experiences ; intermediate, which are equivalent to the so-called concepts ; and, lastly, the great complex of personality as a whole. The task of education is the harmonious development of these three different types of complexes.

If this is well and truly carried out, revelations of unsuspected truths follow and conviction is aroused. The importance of ideals is insisted on as well as their dynamic nature. Instinct again is defined as the synthetic experience of the race and an important distinction is drawn between egoism and personality. The personal element in any judgment however seemingly impartial is noted, and the higher and lower nature of instinct analysed. The dangers of exaggerating the right of children are pointed out, and the confusion of character with reputation is cleared up, as well as that between love and affection. The author rightly emphasises our mutual interdependence, so often overlooked to-day, which is in fact due to the influence of the isolating and estranging postulates that underlie our present economic system.

We are unfortunately too prone to regard persons and institutions without property as "having no stake in the country," and money as a substitute for exertion. The solution is not to eradicate the economic factor but to subordinate it to the spiritual. In this way competition which is but egoism run mad would be "abolished" in our schools. The author next passes to a discussion of specialisation, and notes the curious fact that it is one of the chief reasons of the craze for record-breaking, often in the most ephemeral matters. It can and should be combatted by a certain attempt at versatility. After pointing out the danger of regarding mere scientific phenomena as objective truth, Mr Fox Pitt analyses the three-fold nature of our environment (a matter of special import in education) into three categories, which may perhaps be described as the universal, the contemporary and the personal. He brings out well the variable psychic factors in the word "events," which as he says is well illustrated in "that aggregation of irreconcilable data which is compiled in the name of history." Equally valuable is his determination of the limitations of scientific concepts. After dealing with the *idola* of religion, he uses with considerable effect his simile of the iceberg to explain conversion,—the centre of spiritual equilibrium has shifted and a submerged part of the complex comes into view. Transposition has in fact occurred. After rejecting the opposite ideals, of trying to make the world conform to certain *à priori* ideas, and of living according to nature, he finds a *via media*, not in ignoring, but sublimating the lower instincts, which leads to the ideal of being born anew in the spirit. He concludes with the conviction that the future lawyer, doctor and teacher will combine the office of both priest and healer.

These are but the dry bones of the book, but the mere examination of the topics dealt with should

suffice to show its value. On the other hand, it should act as a reassurance and an encouragement to those teachers who are already on the right road, and, more valuable still, it should exercise a very powerful appeal on that large section of our leaders who think mainly in terms of science. Here is a gospel they can thoroughly grasp.

The Lancet deals with the book on the following lines:

The author has written a little book on the application of certain findings of experimental psychology to the elucidation of educational problems in the hope of clearing up some prevailing confusions and difficulties. He believes that we err either on the side of making exaggerated claims for the importance of the "inner life," or on the side of assigning too much to the effect of "environment." In the pursuance of a middle path lies our best hope for the future of the race. As far as the former is concerned, the author holds that the strength and worth of our personality are determined by the quality, nobility, and co-ordination of the "complexes" of which it is composed. Complexes are ever in a state of flux, ever changing and developing, adapting themselves to, or assimilating themselves with, their environment. Hence the right way to awaken or develop character is by the harmonious interaction of varying complexes with chosen or accidental environments. An individual's likes and dislikes, tastes and preferences, can be cultivated, repressed, or developed, and in the subordination of the lower to the higher lies the true goal of systematic education. It is a fallacy to imagine that mental disposition and environment are mutually independent; to attain the ideal state of perfect interaction instincts must be rationalised, not ignored. To use a Freudian

expression, they must be sublimated, not denied. The book commends itself to the thoughtful reader and to the teacher who wishes to be more cognisant of the psychical processes involved in the art of pedagogy.

Mr F. J. Gould, author of *Children's Book of Moral Lessons*, *Youth's Noble Path*, etc., writes:

...I have re-read it all. I agree with great expanses of it, and do not oppose any of the remainder: it is merely a question, here and there, of expression. Things you say one way I might say in another; but that is no great matter. Now passages I have marked appreciatively are: pp. 11, 12. "The spontaneous tendency," etc.—a paragraph that specially pleases me. And p. 58—"It is difficult, no doubt" (the changing nature of everybody).

The closing page of chapter 7 gives me a little pause: not because of its whisper of the Unseen, but because it seems to beckon one away from the Material. I want to live *ON* the Material, as the Catholic lives spiritually on the Bread of the Mass: a transfigured Material, indeed, but still,—bread, butter, clothes, a garden, etc., etc. "The gods are here also," as the old Greek Sage gaily (and seriously) said in the blacksmith's shop.

It is a good sign when anybody writes a book on the PURPOSE of education. So much is said of education ONLY!...

Mr Gould can hardly mean by his wish to "live *ON* the Material," a mere desire to continue material existence, apart from aim or purpose. His excellent and far-reaching educational work is a sufficient guarantee that he is

alive to the consideration that "the material" is but a *means* and not in itself an *end*. The tragic situation revealed by the war gives point to a memorable saying of Sir Thomas Browne's: "For the world, I take it, is not an inn but a hospital and a place not to live but to die in." Respect for life is not the same thing as that greatly exaggerated clinging to life, with which modern civilization has familiarised us. Life has to be endured as well as enjoyed; the two go together, but why seek to prolong the agony? The goal of perfection is far enough off in all conscience. There is little danger of its being reached too quickly!

The Pioneer (Allahabad) welcomes the book as:

...Purporting to apply the knowledge gained in the psychological laboratory to the practical work of education.

It thus proceeds:

Now the first question that arises in one's mind is this; what has psychology to tell us about the meaning and import of human personality? For unless the teacher is clear on this fundamental point, he may err *ab initio* through what Dr Johnson called "sheer ignorance." Mr Fox Pitt divides current beliefs on this subject into two main classes. According to one view "a person is a combination of a body, or physical organism with a permanent more or less independent soul-entity which animates it"—a combination radically "evil"; "'man is born in iniquity' and unless 'saved' destined to perdition."

According to the other the mind or character is considered "as a quality or function of the physical organism, to be developed like a plant by contact with a suitable environment." This school of thought insists that "the child is born fundamentally 'good' and that the whole function of education is the skilful drawing out of its innate excellences." Controversialists arguing in support of their own particular prejudice—it amounts to little more with most people—may exclaim, as Mr Pitt points out, that "both doctrines cannot be true," with the implication, of course, that the truth lies with the particular theory they favour. But Mr Pitt reminds us that there is another possibility: both theories may be false; and having thus cleared the ground he sets down briefly what psychology has to teach us concerning our personality. "It may be stated positively," he observes, "as a fact which has been clearly demonstrated, that the human personality under a thorough-going analysis exhibits not a permanent and unalterable separate entity, but a vast combination or aggregation of variegated, fluctuating and loosely organised physical and psychic phases and potentialities, of which no more than a minute fragment makes its presence manifest to our ordinary, or normal, waking consciousness." In other words the human mind is composed of a vast number and great variety of psycho-physical "complexes," or groups of closely associated ideas. These "complexes" Mr Pitt classifies into three main orders: the minor variety, having their genesis in specific experiences, great or small; the intermediate variety, "comprising various intellectual concepts of a co-ordinating and synthetic nature"; and the great complex, i.e., the personality or character as a whole, "rarely awakened as a vivid consciousness," but "in harmony with the universal life," and possessed of infinite potentialities. Mr Pitt then proceeds to

discuss the bearing of all this on the training of the child; it will be seen that Mr Pitt is in substantial agreement with the modern school of educationalists as represented by Dotttoressa Montessori and Mr Edmond Holmes. And indeed his little book may be read with profit side by side with *What is and What Might Be*, and *The Tragedy of Education*, since it gives the reader, in a compendious and eminently readable form, the psychological principles upon which the whole modern conception of the purpose of education may be said to rest.

The British Medical Journal, after carefully summarising and quoting certain passages under the heading "The Psychology of Education," goes on to say:

Speaking of personality, he deprecates hasty division of people into "good" and "bad," and judgments of character by what is temporarily uppermost; seeing that personalities, like icebergs, show only a small and changing portion, at any one time, above the waters of consciousness. Life is a constant interaction between person and surroundings; from these limiting fetters we cannot escape; true liberty is found only in the grasp of truth which harmonizes and explains the apparent chaos of "complexes." The variability of even the most fixed elements of life, such as instincts, ought to warn us against the stupid notion that "betterment" is only to be found in things outside ourselves, as if we were something fixed and central. It follows that the present "unrest" cannot be healed by mere change of environment, but requires an adaptability only to be attained by the cultivation of intelligent volition, not by the blind following of instincts regarded as fixed points. From the latter view follows a narrow

outlook on life, and a striving for "tangible results" of action rather than the ennobling of character.

As to the writer's general philosophic outlook, there is little to quarrel with, as it provides a usefully wide educational ideal; yet one cannot but feel that since the book is intended for the general intelligent public, the manner of statement is too abstract and difficult; there is some lack of crispness of expression, and obscurity is sometimes due to careless writing. A far freer use of illustration would have been helpful to many, even if it had somewhat increased the number of pages. The popularizer must be clear and lucid. This defect is likely to diminish the number of people who will benefit from a short and really interesting exposition of sound educational doctrine.

After stating various aspects of the author's argument in the light of the Herbartian theory, *Education* delivers itself of the following comments:

The difficulty of forming relatively sound mental judgments increases as civilisation advances, and as the circle of verified knowledge extends. Many factors enter into the totality but a most important part is played by the instincts and the emotions. The necessity of gaining a trained control over these is shown.

To a large extent character depends on the effect of heredity, environment, and upon will, either good or bad. It is the resultant of many forces, and the individual reveals himself in the reactions of daily life. The danger consists in setting up a wrong standard of worth, and a motivation of conduct, self-centred, which fails to recognise the individual as a unit of a social whole. The author's protest against a circumscribed view comes as a timely

warning, but the remedy he suggests, that of enlarging the field of vision and consciousness by placing high ideals before children, is being faithfully and conscientiously applied in thousands of schools throughout the world. In this connexion the cultivation of many-sided interests must leave its mark on the rising generation. All, however, cannot become illuminated. The volume will have served a useful purpose if it encourages those who, like the author, recognise that psychology has its practical lessons for the instructor of youth.

From a highly appreciative review of six pages in *The Vedic Magazine* the following are a few extracts:

...That religion, good character and morality, are after all the best means of regeneration of humanity can hardly be brought out more clearly than it has been by Mr Fox Pitt who starting with Experimental Psychology as a guide to determine the purpose of Education gradually finds his way to the conclusion that the Sermon on the Mount is after all the acme of Educational Ideals. That is indeed the purpose of all institutions for human betterment, now and for all time. The manufacture of good souls, to use Ruskin's significant words, is the ideal that must dominate all Education.

After dealing with the interpretation of Human Personality in lines of modern psychology, the argument proceeds: Instinct is the foundation and origin of the complexes. Now instinct has a twofold function. Self-preservation and Race Elevation. That these functions may operate harmoniously, "we should endeavour as early as possible to supplement the instinctive tendencies of our nature by the cultivation of intelligent volitions and by the stimulation of the habit of rapidly forming sound judgment

in difficult situations." The author recommends a happy mean between the old order of repressive asceticism and the modern extravagant claims of "the rights of children," i.e. licentious Hedonism, and insists on the importance of the intelligent co-ordination, sublimation and systematic training of instinctive feelings.

...The difficulty of the Educational problem which presents itself when we endeavour to inculcate the superiority of character to reputation, lies in the fact that the early stages of child development depend so largely on the feeding and cultivation of the minor complexes in which narrow egocentric thoughts and feelings must necessarily predominate. The problem then assumes this form: how are we to counteract these budding and multifarious egoisms in the minor complexes without destroying all incentives to effort?

...The imparting of Religious experience, the inculcation of higher ideals, the bringing about of the birth in the spirit, these make a man the twice-born—that is the purpose of education....How true self-examination is absolutely essential and how a proper kind of confession may be helpful—all this is indicated. In conclusion the author repeats how great importance attaches to the development of higher incentives to effort. The Sermon on the Mount is a summary of such. Restated in cold prosaic language the lesson there inculcated urges us to rely less upon the seen, the concrete, the physically tangible and more upon the spiritual side of our natures unmanifest to our senses but none the less real and permanent. There alone may we gain true security and everlasting peace—this is also what recent psychological research points to.

...That education has a Spiritual purpose behind it and not merely a material one and that to attain this goal we must steer clear of the two extremes of

repression out and out—false asceticism—and indulgence out and out—false hedonism.

“Never to mix our pleasure or our pride
With the sorrow of the meanest thing that feels.”

And further that we must instil such ideals as operate in active benevolence in after life—these are the lessons that we may learn from Mr Fox Pitt’s *Purpose of Education*.

The Educational Times contends that my book is too little:

...In his eighty-three pages Mr Lane Fox Pitt cannot do justice to the vast theme. He says many wise things, and he says them well, but it is impossible to introduce the education applications of recent psychological research in a book of this size. There is too much of the application and too little of the research.

...The ordinary professional teacher, and still more the person interested in educational administration, will be at a loss to understand a theory of education based upon an unconscious mind. Can we expect the practical English educator to maintain his equanimity as he reads “the fact that a great region of mind is neither conscious nor subconscious, but still is mind potentially, and the existence of which is actually felt when we engage in the operation of observing fresh phenomena”?

In a well-known educational work the author tells us, speaking of educational theorists, “by their metaphors shall ye know them.” Mr Lane Fox Pitt’s favourite metaphor is the iceberg with its great mass of submerged matter, and its small part above the surface. He does not lay too much stress on the figure. In fact he gives an excellent figure to illustrate the dangers of using figures. But he does

not escape those dangers. The submerged part of the iceberg is what calls for explanation. If this represents the region of the unconscious mind, it requires a much fuller treatment than this book offers.

We are not attacking the author's views, but merely complaining that in the present state of knowledge of educational theory his work falls between two stools. If he writes for real experts he must go into greater detail in his applications; if he appeals to the great mass of intelligent teachers and others who have an interest in education, but have done only the ordinary amount of reading in the subject, he must give a fuller exposition of the basis on which he builds.

The criticisms in this review seem to me fair enough. In this new edition I have endeavoured to remedy some of the defects to which the reviewer calls attention and I have already dealt with the terminological difficulties in my previous notes in this appendix.

The Indian Churchman (March 1914)
remarks:

...There are those dreadful modern people who preach the gospel of selfishness and make Christian ethics seem so old-fashioned and out-of-date. But if the Sermon on the Mount is in accord with the conclusions of recent psychological research, then that will be splendid. For we really are on the side of the angels, only we are so afraid of being old-fashioned. And if we are sure of the support of the psychologists, then we will come out and say quite loud that we believe in Christian ethics. How does psychology help us? "An examination and analysis of personality exhibits not a permanent and

unalterable separate entity, but a vast combination or aggregation of variegated, fluctuating loosely organised physical and psychic phases and potentialities." We are all familiar with such phrases as being or not being in the "mood" for anything. We are apt to say that we can't explain our moods. Why are we at one time cheerful, at another time depressed, good-tempered or bad-tempered. The external causes of our moods seem often quite inadequate. No doubt indigestion has something to do with it, but even that strikes us as an insufficient explanation of *all* our unpleasant moods or humours. Psychology believes there is an explanation. The mind is composed of a vast number and great variety of "complexes." According to the rise and fall of different complexes in the field of vivid consciousness, so is one's change of mood. The purpose of education should be to encourage, co-ordinate and widen what may be called the good complexes.

We wish that Mr St George Pitt could have told us with a little more detail how it is to be done. His style at times is difficult, and many of his sentences are too long and overburdened with qualifying clauses. There is a touch of faddism here and there as in his reference to the *Merchant of Venice*. "It was evidently written with the object of bringing home to the average intelligence the great truth that 'laws' must be harmonised with mercy." But we think that what he has said in this book was worth saying.

This review, coming from an "orthodox" religious source, is certainly more friendly than I had expected. The points raised by the reviewer have already been dealt with in my previous notes. As to the difficulty he finds occasionally in following my meaning, I should like to refer him again to the text,

though I fear he may think such advice presumptuous, seeing that his appreciative review has resulted from "a careful reading of the book." However, the subject is one of great, indeed I might almost say of the greatest, difficulty and no one should expect to master it without a great deal of trouble.

The Buddhist Review quotes a number of typical passages and proceeds:

...The Buddhist reader will at once recognise the identity of their main teaching with that of the great Wanderer of the Ganges so many centuries ago. It is true that one may question very much whether such terms as "complex," "sphere of freedom," "phase," and so forth are so clearly set forth in this book as to remain luminously in the reader's mind after he has perused it; and the "test of right ideas" (p. 13) is far indeed from being as distinct an everyday test as that should be. Moreover, too much stress cannot be laid upon the fact that all our "environment" is Karma-made. Again, in the present writer's opinion, the pressing duty of the education is, as far as may be, to change reasoning processes into intuition processes, with a view to the more rapid development of the human mind.

We must enter a very strong protest also against the rather surprising reference on the last page of the book to the Sermon on the Mount as "urging us to rely less upon the seen, the concrete, the physically tangible; and more upon the spiritual side of our natures, unmanifest to our senses, but none the less real and permanent." Not in this way are "security and everlasting peace." The sermon, while comprising (as it could hardly help doing) some very

laudable matter, is as a whole generally admitted to be unsuitable to any practical age; and has none of the supreme width and universal applicability of the Dhammapada. It is to the Buddha that the world is half-consciously looking not so much for psychological analysis, as for pure and unimpeachable criteria of mental enlightenment, of right effort.

Careful readers will be pleased with much that the author has written; and will find not a few sentences that illuminate a subject too much beset with intricacies and verbal shadows.

These two letters subjoined, from M. Emile Boutroux (de l'Académie française; Directr. Fondation Thiers) and the Rt Hon. Sir Frederick Pollock, Bart., P.C. (Chairman of the Permanent Executive Council of the International Moral Education Congress), give expression to one of the main points of my theme.

PARIS, *December 24th*, 1913.

My dear Colleague,—Please accept my best thanks for the excellent book you kindly sent to me. I read it with much profit and interest, as it is as practical as solid and highly thought. I like your ideas very much, e.g. the assertion that even to-day the best part of our social life has a non-economic basis. You excellently show how science and art can be reconciled as to the question of education. I remain, my dear Colleague, sincerely yours,

EM. BOUTROUX.

21, HYDE PARK PLACE, W.

Jan. 5th, 1914.

Dear FOX PITT,—Thanks for the sight of Boutroux' note, which I return. Certainly the text "Man shall not live by bread alone" needs to be preached on afresh for every generation, and in new forms, though (or because?) it is ancient and everybody is supposed to know it. I have not had time to learn the terms of art of modern psychology sufficiently to follow your exposition with perfect understanding; so far as I can see it is all on the right line. Miss "Beauchamp," Sally & Co., I do know. I found the story more engrossing than any detective novel.

I don't see how positive social institutions can help having *some* economic basis: but don't believe it has ever been merely individualist: certainly the Common Law pulls up the individual pretty sharp at various points: the Roman law less—why I know not.

In our profession we do something to maintain an extra-economic ideal, and I believe the points of etiquette that seem oddest to lay people are quite sound. So do the doctors. As for the clergy—if they had any proper professional discipline, I don't mean merely canons and courts, a Kikuyu (*lege* in the mouth of the High Anglican: Kick—Who?—You!) scandal would be impossible. Yours sincerely,

F. POLLOCK.

From M. Henri Bergson, de l'Académie française, past President of the Society for Psychical Research:

...Je n'ai pu, malheureusement, qu'y jeter un coup d'œil; mais ce coup d'œil a suffi à m'en montrer l'intérêt....

Professor Gilbert Murray, LL.D., Litt.D., President of the Society for Psychical Research, writes :

...I found it most suggestive and interesting, and I hope that some of the ordinary educators may attend to it.

Mrs Henry Sidgwick, D.Litt., LL.D., past President of the Society for Psychical Research, writes :

...I think it should be suggestive and helpful, and of course it is important to emphasise the psychic side of education.

Dr F. C. S. Schiller, D.Sc., past President of the Society for Psychical Research, writes :

...I observe that you wisely avoid entering into the thorny details of the educational systems actually in operation.

These details are "thorny" only to those who attach an undue importance to them. It is a distressing feature of past educational controversies that attention has been riveted on questions of "method," almost to the exclusion of aim and purpose. I fear this is one of the evils of professionalism.

Professor J. W. Adamson, Fellow of King's College, London, Professor of Education in the University of London, writes :

...I have read the book with great enjoyment. It strikes me as a most lucid presentation of the leading facts of Consciousness as these are apprehended by present-day psychologists. If I may say so, the

emphasis which is laid upon the spiritual nature of man (and, in consequence, the spiritual nature of his true satisfactions) is teaching which we all very much need to lay to heart. Such teaching was, I suppose, never unnecessary; the evidence is overwhelming that it is especially needed at this time.

Sir George R. Askwith, K.C.B., K.C., M.A., D.C.L., Chief Industrial Commissioner, writes:

I have read it with much interest: and am going through it again, as its full effect cannot be superficially grasped by one perusal,—at least not by me, to whom some of the points are novel.

Referring to *The Purpose of Education* in the *Commonweal*, the editor (Mrs Besant) says:

This admirable production is published by the *Cambridge University Press*. The author is an experienced educationalist. The book should be read by all teachers and all occupied or interested in Education.

Dr H. Wildon Carr, D.Litt., President of the Aristotelian Society, writes in reference to the present edition:

...You put your views very clearly and convincingly....I still prefer the first chapter, but it is all good.

The Hon. Dr Deva Prasad Sarvadhikary, C.I.E., LL.D., Vice-Chancellor of the Calcutta University, writes:

...I appreciate your book....You ask "Is it too much to hope that some day, in the distant future, the properly qualified doctor, surgeon, lawyer and teacher may each and all of them combine in themselves the

highest functions of both priest and healer?" But why in the "distant future" my good friend? The guru of old, in Hindu times, was doctor, surgeon, lawyer, teacher, spiritual guide, healer, all in one. We, who are neither fish, nor flesh nor good red herring, have lost it all! Hence the need of Moral Education.

By asking "Why in the distant future," Dr Sarvadhikary leaves one in doubt as to whether he believes any true specimens of the combination still exist!

Mr A. Yusuf Ali, late I.C.S., writes:

I duly received your excellent book: *The Purpose of Education*. I have finished all but the last three chapters, which I am finishing now. I consider your remarks on moral and economic values are of special importance to present-day India. The enormous change that has recently taken place in Indian life has more reference to the change of "values" in the Indian mind than to anything else. Did you find it so during your last Indian visit?...

The following extracts from two different Journals, of about the same date, present an amusing contrast:

...Mr Pitt takes us back to first principles with a vengeance: an exposition of "the psychical processes involved in the art of pedagogy" is an alarming enterprise, and when it is carried out to an accompaniment of "psycho-physical complexes," "egocentric thoughts," and "herd instincts," it is time for the unlearned to withdraw. His book states (without a glossary and with such lucidity as the subject appears to permit) the conclusions of recent psychological research; that may well be. Mr Pitt compares personality to an iceberg, but he

has succeeded in making the psycho-physical complex of at least one of his students fill like the *Titanic*.”
(*Daily News*, “Books of the Day.”)

...Most of its pages verge on the platitudinous, and a good many are frankly flat and banal. Here, for instance, is a specimen from page 36 taken almost at random as a specimen of Mr Fox Pitt’s talent of presenting mental commonplace in the garb of profound philosophical reflection: “Good name and good reputation are synonymous, but they do not invariably tally with good character; for the character of an individual is his actual nature, his true qualities, capacities, and disposition; while his reputation is the recorded or otherwise expressed opinions or beliefs which are generally held in regard to him and his works.” Many thoughtful people have their doubts as to whether psychology can ever really attain to the rank of a true science, and their doubts will not be greatly lightened by the pompous presentation of obvious ideas which are the common intellectual stock-in-trade of the least intelligent.
(*The Sunday Times*.)

There have been many more notices, for the most part favourable, but I have given a fair selection. It is, I presume, the experience of most authors to find their works praised or blamed according to the fancy of reviewers or to what they believe to be the taste of their readers. But it must be puzzling to the novice to discover the very positive way in which he is assured that his writing is at once so difficult as to be practically incomprehensible and so obvious as to be altogether commonplace and platitudinous!

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